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ON THE PROSPECT OF
“DAUBERTIZING” JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT
THOMAS O. MCGARITY*
I
INTRODUCTION
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court
assigned a gatekeeper role to federal district courts hearing cases involving
expert testimony.  Daubert requires trial judges to so acquaint themselves with
the scientific underpinnings of expert testimony in common-law litigation that
they can determine whether that testimony represents a sufficiently sound
application of scientific principles to a sufficiently robust set of scientific data to
justify the expert’s scientific conclusions.2  At the same time, the trial judge is
obliged to determine whether the scientific testimony is relevant to factual
determinations the jury must make—that is, whether the information fits the
issues raised by the case. 3  In the decade following the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, it has become quite clear that Daubert has had a profoundly negative
impact on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ use of common-law torts to hold companies
accountable for the adverse effects of their products and byproducts on human
health and the environment.4
Attorneys for companies successfully using Daubert to avoid such account-
ability now urge the federal courts to assume a similar gatekeeper role in
reviewing risk assessments undertaken by federal regulatory agencies.  Lawyers
for companies subject to federal health, safety, and environmental regulation
hope that stringent substantive judicial review will relieve their clients of the
burdens of much substantive regulation without the need for troublesome leg-
islative battles they seem unable to win.  Such stringent review would require
the courts to evaluate the scientific conclusions underlying agency risk assess-
ments with a Daubert-inspired “corpuscular” approach.5
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Id. at 590 & n.9, 593-95.  The Court later held that the trial court must play the same gate-
keeper role with respect to expert testimony involving engineering conclusions.  Kumho Tire v. Car-
michael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
3. 509 U.S. at 591, 593-95.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
5. See infra text accompanying note 116.
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Assigning a Daubert-like gatekeeper role to courts engaged in judicial
review of agency risk assessments is a profoundly bad idea.  First, federal judges
are not qualified to undertake strict scrutiny of the scientific bases for risk-
assessment data and analysis.  Judges’ limited competence in areas involving
scientific data and analysis, complex modeling exercises, and large uncertainties
is well recognized in administrative law and has been effectively demonstrated
by the courts themselves in post-Daubert toxic torts opinions.  Second, because
risk assessment is not a purely scientific enterprise, “Daubertizing” judicial
review of agency risk assessments will bestow upon the courts a policymaking
role that is entirely inappropriate for a politically unaccountable institution.
Third, the agencies preparing these risk assessments are, as part of the execu-
tive branch, performing a function assigned to them by the legislative branch.
So the potential for aggrandizing judicial power through intensifying judicial
scrutiny of the science-policy determinations underlying agency-prepared risk
assessments raises serious institutional issues not present in Daubert-style
review of expert testimony in private tort litigation.  Finally, the “Daubertiza-
tion” of agency risk assessments would have a predictable impact on regulatory
policy running directly counter to the precautionary policies animating most
health, safety, and environmental statutes.  The proponents of strict judicial
risk-assessment scrutiny have a clear, normative agenda in mind.  Having failed
during the 104th Congress to reign in federal regulatory agencies by enacting
sometimes draconian regulatory-reform legislation,6 regulatory reformers are
now attempting to gain regulatory relief in the courts by subtly assigning a more
activist role to judges, who are perceived to be more sympathetic to their goals
than Congress.7  The courts should forcefully reject this invitation to reform
protective health, safety, and environmental regulation to fit these judges’ con-
cepts of the proper role for federal regulation in society.
6. See William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of
Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 298 (1996); Thomas O. McGarity, Deflecting
the Assault: How EPA Survived a “Disorganized Revolution” by “Reinventing” Itself a Bit, 31 Envtl. L.
Rep. 11,249 (2001).
7. Observing the post-Daubert tendency of federal judges to bring about normative changes in the
substantive law of torts, Professor Findley argues quite persuasively that the judges “have been using
their evidentiary gatekeeper power to squarely align tort law with the conservative causal normative
principles of epidemiology, thus moving the law sharply away from the more consumer protective social
policies about risk embodied in the safety regulatory system.”  Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to
the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causa-
tion Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336 (1999).  The strict judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence
implicit in the Daubert screening role is similarly an invitation to regulatory reformers on the bench to
change substantive health and environmental protection law.
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II
DAUBERT AND THE CORPUSCULAR APPROACH TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. The Nature of Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is an analytical process that “uses available scientific infor-
mation on the properties of an agent and its effects in biological systems to pro-
vide an evaluation of the potential for harm as a consequence of environmental
exposure to the agent.”8  Risk assessment must be distinguished from risk man-
agement, which consists of the actions individuals and regulatory agencies take
to reduce or eliminate the risks human beings encounter.9  As currently con-
ceived, risk assessment itself consists of four discrete analytical exercises: hazard
assessment, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk charac-
terization.10  The enhanced judicial review envisioned by Alan Raul’s proposal
to Daubertize judicial review of risk assessment is probably most relevant to the
hazard assessment function.11
1. Hazard Assessment
Hazard assessment is “the process of determining whether exposure to an
agent can cause an increase in the incidence of a health condition.”12  This func-
tion parallels the general causation determination in toxic tort litigation.13  Typi-
cally, hazard assessment relies upon one or more of four different kinds of
information: (1) controlled human experiments; (2) epidemiological studies; (3)
animal testing studies; and (4) various studies of chemical structure, reactivity,
8. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed.
Reg. 17,960, 17,963 (proposed April 23, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Proposed Guidelines].
9. See COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH,
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE
PROCESS 18-19 (1983) [hereinafter NAS RED BOOK].  As described by the National Academy of Sci-
ences:
Risk management, which is carried out by regulatory agencies under various legislative man-
dates, is an agency decision-making process that entails consideration of political, social, eco-
nomic, and engineering information with risk-related information to develop, analyze, and
compare regulatory options and to select the appropriate regulatory response to a potential
chronic health hazard.
Id.; see also U.S. Envtl. Protection Protection Agency, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51
Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,993 (published Sept. 24, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Final Guidelines] (“Risk man-
agement combines the risk assessment with the directives of regulatory legislation, together with socio-
economic, technical, political, and other considerations, to reach a decision as to whether or how much
to control future exposure to the suspected toxic agents.”).
10. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 3.
11. See infra text accompanying note 110; Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory
Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Princi-
ples into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Autumn 2003).
12. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 19.
13. To establish general causation, a plaintiff in a toxic tort action must prove that the substance to
which he or she was exposed (and for which exposure the defendant was responsible) is capable of
causing the injury for which the plaintiff is seeking compensation.  See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbes-
tos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995); Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2122 (1997).
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mutagenicity, and DNA damage and repair.14
a. Human tests.  Ordinarily, controlled human tests are the best evidence
of toxicity to humans.15  But, as a practical matter, cost and ethical considera-
tions severely limit the extent to which controlled human studies are available
for determining the toxicity of potentially toxic agents.16  This is so in the case of
carcinogenicity, for example, because it can take decades to manifest itself and
is often fatal.  The same is true for reproductive and developmental toxicity, the
assessment of which raises serious ethical questions concerning the ability of the
subject to consent to testing.17
b. Epidemiological studies.  The next-best evidence for use in hazard
assessment comes from epidemiological studies of human exposures occurring
outside the context of a controlled experiment.18  Epidemiology is a relatively
new science, and epidemiologists have only in the last quarter century begun to
develop consistent definitions and prescribe evaluative criteria for epidemiol-
ogical studies.19  An epidemiological study consists of a statistical comparison of
human beings who have received a higher-than-normal exposure to a particular
agent with others who have received little or none.20  The two broad types of
epidemiological studies are cohort studies and case-control studies.  In cohort
studies, groups of individuals who have received high exposures to the sub-
stance being studied are identified and compared to groups of similarly situated
individuals who have received low exposures to determine possible differences
in the occurrence of particular diseases.21  Cohort studies can be conducted pro-
spectively—by identifying the two cohorts in advance of the exposure and fol-
14. See NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 20 (“Four general classes of information may be used in
this step: epidemiologic data, animal-bioassay data, data on in-vitro effects, and comparisons of molecu-
lar structure.”); WORK GROUP ON RISK ASSESSMENT, INTERAGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON
GROUP, (IRLG), SCIENTIFIC BASES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL CARCINOGENS AND
ESTIMATION OF RISKS, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979).
15. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed.
Reg. 56,274, 56,278-79, 56,309 (1996) [hereinafter Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines]; U.S. Envtl. Pro-
tection Agency, Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798, 63,809
(1991) [hereinafter Developmental Toxicity Guidelines].
16. KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 72 (2d ed. 1998);
see also NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 12 (“Ethical considerations prevent deliberate human experi-
mentation with potentially dangerous chemicals.”).
17. See Lainie Friedman Ross, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the Current
Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159 (Winter 1997); Michael J.
Loscialpo, Note, Nontherapeutic Human Research Experiments on Institutionalized Mentally Retarded
Children: Civil Rights and Remedies, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 139 (1997).
18. Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,297.
19. ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16, at 4.
20. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,972 (“The goals of cancer epidemiology are to
identify differences in cancer risk between different groups in a population or between different popu-
lations, and then to determine the extent to which these differences in risk can be attributed causally to
specific exposures to exogenous or endogenous factors.”).
21. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,973; ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16,
at 79-91 (discussing generally cohort studies, data analysis study design, and related issues of classifica-
tion and measurement).
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lowing the groups through time—or retrospectively—through the use of histori-
cal records.22  In case-control studies, groups of similarly situated individuals
with and without a particular disease are compared to determine the extent of
any differences in exposure to the substance being studied.23  If the group with
the disease has a higher degree of exposure, a statistical association between the
exposure and the disease might exist.
The determinant of cause and effect in epidemiology is the concept of rela-
tive risk.  The epidemiologist compares the frequency of the disease in the
exposed population with the frequency in the unexposed population to deter-
mine whether relative frequency is increased by exposure.24  If the data can be
arranged so that it is possible to observe groups with varying degrees of expo-
sure, then the existence of a dose-response relationship increases the epidemi-
ologist’s confidence in the results.25
Epidemiologists and other scientists frequently invoke tests of statistical sig-
nificance to assess chance as a possible explanation for the observed data.26  If
the relationship between the exposure and a particular result is not statistically
significant, then chance may explain the result.  The statistical significance
threshold level is determined by the scientist; it is a policy choice that depends
upon the scientist’s willingness to accept that what appears to be a cause-effect
relationship may in fact be the product of chance.  Thus, the fact that an asso-
ciation is not statistically significant at a given level does not negate a cause-
effect relationship; it merely suggests that the probability of a chance result is
sufficiently high in the scientist’s opinion to preclude a cause-effect conclusion.27
The statistical power of an epidemiological study to support conclusions
about cause-effect relationships depends upon four factors: (1) the size of the
study group; (2) the level and duration of exposure; (3) the frequency of the
relevant disease outcome in the general population; and (4) the level of excess
risk to be identified.28  The confidence with which one can draw conclusions
from a study in which no adverse effects are detected depends entirely on its
power to detect such effects.29  Unfortunately, cost considerations generally lead
to epidemiological studies that are not especially powerful.  Therefore, a nega-
tive epidemiological study rarely warrants a strong conclusion that human expo-
sure to a substance and disease share no cause-effect relationship.30
22. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,973.
23. Id.; ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16, at 93-114 (discussing study design and variants
of case-control study design, and comparison to cohort studies).
24. See James J. Schlesselman, Proof of Cause and Effect in Epidemiologic Studies: Criteria for
Judgment, 16 PREVENTIVE MED. 195, 197 (1987).
25. Id. at 201.
26. See id. at 196-97.
27. See id. at 197.
28. Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,299; Developmental Toxicity Guide-
lines, supra note 15, at 63,809.
29. Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,299.
30. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,967 (“[W]hen cancer effects are not found in an
exposed human population, this information by itself is not generally sufficient to conclude that the
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The consistency of a result across different places, circumstances, and times
enhances the confidence in a positive cause-effect conclusion.31  The strength of
the association, or the magnitude of the relative risk, is also an important
factor.32  Although the demand for strength varies, many epidemiologists insist
upon a relative risk of at least 2.0 before they are willing to consider the possi-
bility of a cause-effect relationship.33  The specificity of the end-point is likewise
relevant.  If, for example, smoking is associated with squamous-cell carcinoma,
cohort studies focusing upon both squamous-cell carcinomas and adenocarci-
nomas are not as specific as those focusing exclusively on the former.
Other important criteria in evaluating an epidemiological study’s conclu-
sions are coherence and biological plausibility.  A cause-effect conclusion is not
well-founded if it is not “consistent with the known facts of the natural history
and biology of the disease.”34  On the other hand, if the conclusion is plausible,
given the existing knowledge about how chemical agents interact with human
cells,  the cause-effect conclusion might be warranted.  Animal studies and
human experiments can lend great support to any conclusion that might be
drawn from epidemiological analysis.35  It is even appropriate for an epidemi-
ologist to draw support from analogous systems.36  For example, epidemiologists
conducting studies on the health risks from passive exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke might draw on the vast body of epidemiology on the health
effects of active smoking.  Reliance upon analogy is most appropriate when the
two exposures being compared are sufficiently similar with respect to disease
producing factors, a matter that is frequently highly debatable.
In recent years, scientists have learned how to enhance the power of indi-
vidual epidemiological studies through meta-analysis of the data from several
such studies.  Meta-analysis is the process of statistically combining the results
of many studies dealing with similar diseases and risk factors to yield additional
information enhancing the epidemiologist’s understanding of the associations
between potentially toxic agents and their effects.37  Many epidemiological
studies (especially case-control studies) observe only a very small number of
agent poses no carcinogenic hazard to this or other populations of potentially exposed
humans . . . because epidemiologic studies usually have low power to detect and attribute responses.”).
31. Schlesselman, supra note 24, at 200.
32. Id.
33. The relative risk detected in an epidemiological study is the ratio of the incidence of the disease
of interest in the exposed population to the incidence in the unexposed population.  See MICHAEL D.
GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 30-34 (1996).
34. Schlesselman, supra note 24, at 200.
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id.
37. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,974 (“When utilized appropriately, meta-analysis
can enhance understanding of associations between sources and their effects that may not be apparent
from examination of epidemiologic studies individually.”); ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16,
at 643-73 (discussing generally meta-analysis techniques and data interpretation, quantitative methods
for reviewing other epidemiologic studies and results reported in literature); Erica Beecher-Monas, A
Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L.
REV. 1047, 1071-72 (1999) (observing that “[m]eta-analysis, which averages the results of many individ-
ual studies, is a way of reducing sampling error by increasing the size of the sample”).
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individuals.  These studies therefore lack sufficient power to detect modest
increases in relative risk that could be significant for an agent to which there is
widespread human exposure.  Meta-analysis increases the observational power
of these studies by combining their results.38
In obtaining and analyzing epidemiological data, epidemiologists must care-
fully avoid “bias” 39— in this context, “a systematic departure of results from the
correct values as a consequence of errors in design or investigational tech-
nique.”40  Unfortunately, limitations in the data sources ordinarily available to
epidemiologists can introduce unintended bias,41 as can a variety of other influ-
ences:
Bias can arise from several sources, including noncomparability between populations
of factors such as general health, diet, lifestyle, or geographic location; differences in
the way case and control individuals recall past events; differences in data collection
that result in unequal ascertainment of health effects in the populations; and unequal
follow-up of individuals.42
The effect of bias on the validity of conclusions that the scientist may draw from
epidemiological studies can range from negligible to devastating.43
One especially prevalent form of bias in epidemiology is the confounding
factor, a risk factor for the disease at issue that is associated with the exposure
under study in the source population and that is not otherwise affected by the
exposure or the disease.44  If confounding factors unrelated to the exposure of
the substance at issue can account for the observed differences in disease rates,
it might be inappropriate to conclude that the exposure to the substance is
responsible for those differences.45  Under such circumstances, epidemiologists
must adjust their study designs or statistical analyses to reduce the effect of con-
38. In the words of the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on the Epidemiology of Air
Pollution, “[i]n essence, meta-analysis assumes that the results of studies can themselves be treated as
random variables with predictable distributions.”  COMM. ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AIR
POLLUTANTS, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND AIR POLLUTION 218 (1985).  Meta-analy-
sis is not appropriate, however, when the studies being combined are not comparable or contain sub-
stantial confounding or other biases for which the statistical analysis does not adjust.  1996 Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,974 (noting that meta-analysis may not be useful “when there are sub-
stantial confounding or other biases that cannot be adjusted for in the analysis”).
39. See generally GREEN, supra note 33.
40. Schlesselman, supra note 24.
41. See ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16, at 119 (citing one study that “listed dozens of
possible biases that can distort the estimation of an epidemiologic measure”); Schlesselman, supra note
24, at 195 (noting that the “[c]auses of bias are legion”); see also Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity,
Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1420-21 (1994) (explaining recall
bias in cases involving pharmaceuticals).
42. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,973; see also ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra
note 16, at 119-33 (describing three general types of bias: selection bias, confounding, and information
bias).
43. Schlesselman, supra note 24, at 195.
44. ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16, at 123-25; see also 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 8, at 17,974; Schlesselman, supra note 24, at 196 (observing that “confounding variables are those
that satisfy three conditions: (a) they are determinants or correlates of the disease under study; (b) they
are unequally distributed among exposed and unexposed individuals; (c) they are not consequences of
the study exposure”).
45. ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 16, at 59-62, 120-25.
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founding factors.46  When complete adjustment is not possible, however, it might
still be able to draw conclusions about an agent’s ability to cause disease if mul-
tiple studies with different potential confounders yield similar results.47
c. Animal studies.  Because human testing is usually impossible, and
because epidemiological studies are very difficult to undertake and reveal
important information only after harm to human beings has already occurred,
regulatory agencies rely heavily upon laboratory animal tests to evaluate the
toxicity of chemicals.48  For example, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”),49 the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) requires pesticide registrants to produce a basic set of core animal
testing studies prior to marketing their products.50  Most agencies rely upon the
default assumption that “positive effects in animal cancer studies indicate that
the agent under study can have carcinogenic potential in humans.”51  Positive
results in two or more animal species is strong evidence of human carcinogenic-
ity.52  Likewise, two or more negative animal tests support the conclusion that an
agent does not cause cancer in humans—in the absence of human data to the
contrary.53
However, despite the obvious importance of animal studies to toxicological
evaluation, parties opposed to agency reliance on animal studies always raise
the issue of inter-species extrapolation.  Human beings do not always metabo-
46. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,974.
47. Id. (“If consistent increases in cancer risk are observed across a collection of studies with dif-
ferent confounding factors, the inference that the agent under investigation was the etiologic factor is
strengthened, even though complete adjustment for confounding factors cannot be made and no single
study supports a strong inference.”).
48. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 22 (“Limitations [on epidemology] require reliance on less
direct evidence that a health hazard exists.”).
49. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
50. Purposes of the Registration Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.202(e) (2003).  EPA explains
the utility of one type of animal study in this way:
(e) Hazard to humans and domestic animals. Data required to assess hazards to humans and
domestic animals are derived from a variety of acute, subchronic and chronic toxicity tests,
and tests to assess mutagenicity and pesticide metabolism.
. . . .
(6) Metabolism studies. Data from studies on the absorption, distribution, excretion, and
metabolism of a pesticide aid in the valuation of test results from other toxicity studies
and in the extrapolation of data from animals to man. The main purpose of metabolism
studies is to produce data which increase the Agency’s understanding of the behavior of
the chemical in its consideration of the human exposure anticipated from intended uses of
the pesticide.
Id.
51. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,967.
52. Id. (“[I]f no adequate human data are present, positive effects in animal cancer studies are a
basis for assessing the carcinogenic hazard to humans.”).
53. Id. (“When cancer effects are not found in well-conducted animal cancer studies in two or more
appropriate species and other information does not support the carcinogenic potential of the agent,
these data provide a basis for concluding that the agent is not likely to possess human carcinogenic
potential, in the absence of human data to the contrary.”).
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lize toxic agents in the same way laboratory animals do, and human organs and
reproductive systems are by no means identical to those of mice and rats.54  The
dose an animal receives in a standard feeding experiment can be difficult to
compare to real-world human exposure, though pharmacokinetic studies on the
animals and human beings can facilitate such comparisons.55  The usefulness of
laboratory animal data can therefore be enhanced considerably by pharmacoki-
netic studies on the animals and on human beings.56  In short, “there are no
doubt occasions in which observations in animals may be of highly uncertain
relevance to humans.”57  The decision to rely upon animal studies, therefore,
represents a policy judgment that the informational value of animal studies
outweighs the attendant uncertainties of inter-species extrapolation.58
d. Other kinds of studies.  In recent years, scientists have developed less
expensive carcinogenicity tests that probe the mutagenic potential of an agent
under in vitro conditions.59  Although such tests can provide some evidence of
carcinogenicity, they are not sufficiently accurate to support such a finding inde-
pendently.60  Risk assessors can also compare the chemical structure of an agent
to the chemical structure of a substance with a known toxicity to assess the
potential human hazard.61  But since it is well known that two chemicals having
almost identical chemical structures can produce very different toxicity end-
points,62 similar chemical structure is even weaker support for a hazard assess-
ment than in vitro tests.63  Consequently, in-vitro tests and structure-activity
54. Developmental Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 63,798.
55. Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,302; Developmental Toxicity Guide-
lines, supra note 15, at 63,813.  Pharmacokinetic studies provide detailed information on exposures to
pesticides and their metabolites in particular human and animal organs or tissues.  Id.
56. Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,302; Developmental Toxicity Guide-
lines, supra note 15, at 63,813.  In the context of reproductive and developmental toxicity, pharmacoki-
netic studies yield useful information on “absorption, half-life, steady-state and/or peak plasma concen-
trations, placental metabolism and transfer, excretion in breast milk, comparative metabolism, and
concentrations of the parent compound and metabolites,” all of which can be quite useful in risk assess-
ment.  Developmental Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 63,813; see also Reproductive Toxicity
Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,302.  For example, a good pharmacokinetic study that yields data on
the dose received by the particular organ or tissue of concern can aid in comparing the animal testing
dose with human exposure.  Developmental Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 63,813.
57. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 22.
58. See Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution
of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 743-44
(1979).
59. See NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 22 (“Considerable experimental evidence supports the
proposition that most chemical carcinogens are mutagens and that many mutagens are carcinogens.”).
60. Id. at 23 (“Such data, in the absence of a positive animal bioassay, are rarely, if ever, sufficient
to support a conclusion that an agent is carcinogenic.”).
61. Id. (“Comparison of an agent’s chemical or physical properties with those of known carcino-
gens provides some evidence of potential carcinogenicity.”).
62. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING PESTICIDE CHEMICALS
AND OTHER SUBSTANCES THAT HAVE A COMMON MECHANISM OF TOXICITY 4, 8 (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/ERA-PEST/1999/February/Day-05/6055.pdf; see Notice of Availability, 64
Fed. Reg. 5796 (Feb. 5, 1999).
63. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 23 (“[S]uch studies are best used to identify potential car-
cinogens for further investigation and may be useful in priority-setting for carcinogenicity testing.”).
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analyses play very modest roles in most risk assessments, and agencies rarely
rely heavily upon such studies to support regulatory actions.64
2. Dose-Response Assessment
Dose-response assessment is “the process of characterizing the relation
between the dose of an agent administered or received and the incidence of an
adverse health effect in exposed populations and estimating the incidence of the
effect as a function of human exposure to the agent.”65  Dose-response assess-
ment typically “requires extrapolation from high to low dose and extrapolation
from animals to humans.”66  Such extrapolations typically involve complex
mathematical models themselves based upon critical assumptions about the
interactions between chemicals and the human body.  As scientists have learned
more about interactions between chemicals and DNA, carcinogenesis dose-
response models have been modified to reflect new scientific understandings.67
Even so, the models are still highly dependent upon assumptions.  A risk asses-
sor’s choice among available models is usually driven as much by regulatory
policy as by some underlying understanding of human physiology and toxicol-
ogy.68
3. Exposure Assessment
The extent of human exposure to an environmental contaminant is the third
critical piece of the risk assessment puzzle.69  A properly conducted exposure
assessment “identifies human populations exposed or potentially exposed to an
agent, describes their composition and size, and presents the types, magnitudes,
frequencies, and durations of exposure to the agent.”70  An accurate exposure
assessment for most chemical substances must include an assessment of dietary,
dermal, and inhalation exposures to the agent.  Since “there is no single
approach to exposure assessment that is appropriate for all cases,”71 the expo-
sure component of a risk assessment can come from “monitoring information,
64. 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,979; 1986 Final Guidelines, supra note 9, at
33,993.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 20.
67. See, e.g., National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compli-
ance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,888, 38,901 (proposed June 22, 2000)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 and 142) (reviewing conclusions of a panel assembled by the
National Research Council and an expert panel assembled by EPA on the shape of the dose-response
curve for arsenic).
68. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance
and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7004 (Jan. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142) (“The use of a linear procedure to extrapolate from a higher, observed data
range to a lower range beyond observation is a science-policy approach that has been in use by Federal
agencies for four decades.”); McGarity, supra note 58, at 732.
69. See NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 20 (defining exposure assessment as “the process of
measuring or estimating the intensity, frequency, and duration of human exposures to an agent cur-
rently present in the environment”).
70. Developmental Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 63,799.
71. 1986 Final Guidelines, supra note 9, at 33,998.
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modeling results, and/or reasoned estimates.”72  Because of the dearth of empiri-
cal data in cases of occupational and environmental exposures, risk assessors
frequently rely upon mathematical models to assess exposure.73  Any “assump-
tions, approximations, and uncertainties” inherent in the application of the
model to existing data should be clearly stated because they are likely to “have
a major effect on the risk assessment.”74
4. Risk Characterization
An agency planning to employ risk assessments in its regulatory decisions
must be prepared to explain those assessments to the regulated community and
to the general public.  Risk characterization is “the process of estimating the
incidence of a health effect under the various conditions of human exposure
described in exposure assessment.”75  In addition to combining hazard and
exposure assessments into a single risk assessment, a risk characterization
should evaluate the overall quality of the risk assessment, describe in under-
standable terms the nature and extent of the potential harm, and convey a sense
of the uncertainties that surround any quantitative statements.76  In particular, a
risk characterization should identify any assumptions or inferences that the
assessor employs and the policy or scientific basis for such inferences.  When
scientists have not reached a consensus about a particular issue—as is often the
case—the agency should present both sides of the issue and explain the policy
reasons for its conclusion.77
5. The “Weight-of-the-Evidence” Approach to Risk Assessment
In the final analysis, the health and the environmental risks posed by toxic
agents cannot be proven with “the compelling certainty that is reached through
mathematical reasoning.”78  Epidemiological proof is ephemeral in nature and
therefore subject to much disagreement; there is no perfect epidemiological
study.79  In the real world of physical constraints and economic limitations, iden-
tifying confounding factors and other sources of bias is an easy task.  It is possi-
ble that “the most one can ever claim for a study is that it provides evidence
72. Id.
73. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 27 (“[T]ypically[,] exposure data are incomplete and must be
estimated.”).
74. 1986 Final Guidelines, supra note 9, at 33,998.  See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by
Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 130-33 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of conducting accurate exposure assess-
ments for pesticide exposures).
75. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 20; see also 1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,971
(“The risk characterization process first summarizes findings on hazard, dose response, and exposure
characterizations, then develops an integrative analysis of the whole risk case.”); Developmental Tox-
icity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 63,819.
76. Reproductive Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 56,308; Developmental Toxicity Guide-
lines, supra note 15, at 63,819; 1986 Final Guidelines, supra note 9, at 33,993.
77. Developmental Toxicity Guidelines, supra note 15, at 63,819.
78. Schlesselman, supra note 24, at 198.
79. Id. at 199.
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which may be construed as supporting or refuting certain explanations for the
findings.”80  Thus, in evaluating epidemiological proof, “what we should seek is
not a criterion of proof, but rather aides de judgment—guides to assist weighing
study evidence and reaching informed opinion.”81
Most agencies have adopted a weight-of-the-evidence approach to assessing
human health risks.82  Under this approach, the agency considers all proffered
studies and determines the weight to be afforded each on the basis of identified
strengths and weaknesses.  Some studies are so poorly conducted that they are
entitled to no weight at all.  Many studies, otherwise flawed in one or more
respects, may nonetheless be appropriately considered to the extent they add to
or detract from conclusions based upon more reliable studies.83  Animal studies
are properly considered under the weight-of-the-evidence approach, as are
meta-analyses of epidemiological studies that might be flawed to some extent.84
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. EPA explained the weight-of-the-evidence approach in the context of carcinogen risk assess-
ment as follows:
Judgment about the weight of evidence involves considerations of the quality and adequacy of
data and consistency of responses induced by the agent in question.  The weight of evidence
judgment requires combined input of relevant disciplines.  Initial views of one kind of evi-
dence may change significantly when other information is brought to the interpretation.  For
example, a positive animal carcinogenicity finding may be diminished by other key data; a
weak association in epidemiologic studies may be bolstered by consideration of other key data
and animal findings.  Factors typically considered are illustrated in figures below.  Generally,
no single weighing factor on either side determines the overall weight.  The factors are not
scored mechanically by adding pluses and minuses; they are judged in combination.
1996 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 8, at 17,981.
83. See Sanders, supra note 41, at 1390 (noting that “scientific validity has multiple meanings and is
always a matter of degree”).
84. EPA’s 1986 Carcinogen Risk Assessment Guidelines presented a system for stratifying the
agency’s weight-of-the-evidence judgment based upon the existing studies.  Drawing heavily upon a
classification scheme used by the International Agency for Research on Cancer, EPA divided chemical
agents into the following categories:
(1) Group A — Carcinogenic to Humans;
(2) Group B — Probably Carcinogenic to Humans;
(3) Group C — Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans;
(4) Group D — Not Classifiable as to Human Carcinogenicity; and
(5) Group E — Evidence of Non-Carcinogenicity for Humans.
1986 Final Guidelines, supra note 9, at 33,996.
According to the classification scheme, the risk assessor puts an agent in Group A if there is “suffi-
cient evidence from epidemiologic studies to support a causal association between exposure to the
agents and cancer.”  Id. at 34,000.  Epidemiological evidence is sufficient if it indicates a causal relation-
ship between the agent and human cancer.  Id. at 33,999.
Group B includes agents for which the weight of evidence of human carcinogenicity based on epi-
demiologic studies is limited, and agents for which the weight of evidence of carcinogenicity based on
animal studies is sufficient.  Epidemiological evidence is limited if it indicates “that a causal interpreta-
tion is credible, but that alternative explanations, such as chance, bias, or confounding, could not ade-
quately be excluded.”  Id.  Animal studies are sufficient if they indicate there is “an increased incidence
of malignant tumors or combined malignant and benign tumors (a) in multiple species or strains; or (b)
in multiple experiments (e.g., with different routes of administration or using different dose levels); or
(c) to an unusual degree in a single experiment with regard to high incidence, unusual site or type of
tumor, or early age at onset.”  Id.
MCGARITY.DOC 02/11/04  4:17 PM
Autumn 2003] ON “DAUBERTIZING” RISK ASSESSMENT 167
Clearly, the tools available for chemical risk assessment are quite rudimen-
tary.  Gaps in existing knowledge about how chemicals interact with the human
body are still quite large, and the hazard identification enterprise is therefore
laden with uncertainty.  Because there is no such thing as perfect hazard identi-
fication, there can be no definitive proof that an environmental agent causes a
particular disease.85  Thus, if definitive proof is the goal, risk assessment is
simply the wrong tool.
B. Daubert and Its Progeny
As plaintiffs’ toxic tort actions moved beyond mesothelioma and other sig-
nature diseases, potential defendants and their trade associations began to
worry about the possibility of such actions changing the way they do business.86
Business groups and conservative foundations created “scores of coalitions and
task forces”87 and began funding academic research aimed at limiting frivolous
lawsuits.88  In his well-publicized polemic Galileo’s Revenge, Manhattan Institute
fellow Peter Huber argued that plaintiffs’ claims that exposure to toxic sub-
stances causes disease are frequently based upon what he termed “junk sci-
ence.”89  Although the empirical basis for this criticism was never convincingly
established,90 Vice President Dan Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness drafted
Group C includes “agents with limited evidence of carcinogenicity in animals in the absence of
human data.”  Id. at 34,000.  Group D includes agents “with inadequate human and animal evidence of
carcinogenicity or for which no data are available.”  Id.  Group E is limited to “agents that show no
evidence for carcinogenicity in at least two adequate animal tests in different species or in both ade-
quate epidemiologic and animal studies.”  Id.
The guidelines suggest that agents in Groups A and B are the primary candidates for quantitative
risk assessment.  Agents in Group C are appropriate candidates for quantitative risk assessment on a
case-by-case basis.  Id. at 33,996.  In general, “estimates based on adequate human epidemiologic data
are preferred over estimates based on animal data.”  Id. at 33,997.
85. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 9, at 19 (“Although the question of whether a substance causes
cancer or other adverse health effects is theoretically a yes–no question, there are few chemicals on
which the human data are definitive.”).
86. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1995).
87. Maxwell Glen, Congress Joins the Hue and Cry Over Liability Insurance Crisis, 18 NAT’L J. 380
(1986).
88. See Burt Solomon, Finger-Pointing Distinguishes Attempts to Fix Blame for Liability Crisis, 18
NAT’L J. 378 (1986) (identifying the American Tort Reform Association as “a coalition of policyholders
assembled last month to lobby for changes in tort law”).  The American Tort Reform Association
gradually evolved into a fully funded American Tort Reform Foundation with an active website.  See
http://www.atrafoundation.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
89. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); see
also W. John Moore, Peter Huber; Free-Lance Critic Hits Shackles of Regulation, 18 NAT’L J. 2797,
(1986) (quoting counsel for the Products Liability Alliance, who refers to Huber’s work as “the intellec-
tual underpinning” of the tort reform effort of the mid-1980’s).
90. Professor Huber’s mostly anecdotal accounts were heavily relied upon by the tort reformers,
but they were harshly reviewed by academics and practitioners.  See Robert F. Blomquist, Science,
Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV. 629 (1991); Ken-
neth J. Chesebro, Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993); John F. Duffy, The
FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation,
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1076-77 (contrasting Huber’s praise of the common law with his criticisms);
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fifty proposals for reforming the civil justice system, six of which related to
tightening judicial scrutiny of scientific expert testimony.91  The overtly political
purpose of these proposed reforms was to enhance the global competitiveness
of U.S. companies by relieving them of the threat of expensive and occasionally
ruinous civil liability.92
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.93 gave the Supreme Court an
opportunity to address the junk science issue directly.94  Since nearly all causa-
tion claims in toxic tort litigation necessarily rest on expert testimony,95 one way
to ensure the invalidity of such claims—and, consequentially, to reduce the inci-
dence of successful lawsuits—is to raise the bar on admissibility of expert testi-
mony.  Unlike the Quayle Commission’s tort reform initiative, which precipi-
tated a loud political debate and ultimately failed,96 the Supreme Court
stemmed the daunting flow of resource-intensive toxic tort lawsuits through a
politically invisible interpretation of the words “scientific” and “knowledge” in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Many observers believe that this is exactly what
the Court had in mind in the Daubert and its progeny.97
The Supreme Court in Daubert declined to employ the Frye “general accep-
tance in the scientific community” standard for admitting expert testimony.98
Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi’s Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183,
186 (1993) (book review).
Reacting to the widespread criticism of the way courts and juries were treating scientific evidence,
the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government conducted a multi-year examina-
tion of that topic through a task force that included prominent members of the scientific community as
well as the bench and bar.  CARNEGIE COMM. ON SCI., TECH. AND GOV’T, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING (1993) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT].
The task force’s report, published just before the Supreme Court issued its Daubert opinion, took a
much less pessimistic view of the ability of courts and juries to cope with the complex scientific issues
that arise in toxic tort litigation.  It pointed out that “many of the criticisms directed at the operation of
our court system arise—quite understandably—from misperceptions about the differing methodologies
and goals of science and law, and from the consequent failure to comprehend the diverse roles and
expertise of ‘judge,’ ‘juror,’ and ‘scientist.’” Id. at 12.  While the Carnegie Commission might have been
correct in concluding that the existing court system was not broken, this Article takes the position that
the federal judiciary’s rather extreme response to the criticism, as signaled by Daubert/Joiner, has con-
tributed to a crisis of accountability that calls for institutional change.
91. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 11, 21-22 (1991), reprinted in Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U.
CIN. L. REV. 979 (1992).  The Vice President’s tort reform initiative relied heavily upon Huber’s analy-
sis of the failings of the tort regime.  See Chesebro, supra note 90, at 1645.
92. See Dan Quayle, Protecting America’s Greatness, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1991, at C7; see also
GREEN, supra note 33, at 19-22 (detailing the “contemporary critique” of the tort system).
93. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94. See Sanders, supra note 41, at 1389 (suggesting that the “emerging belief that an increase in
‘junk science’ in the courtroom requires greater judicial vigilance in admitting expert opinion” fueled a
sense of emergency that persuaded the Supreme Court to examine the role of expert testimony in toxic
tort cases twenty years after the Federal Rules of Evidence had been adopted).
95. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 37, at 1063.
96. See, e.g., M.G., Bumbling on Billions, AM. LAW., April 1992, at 86; Quayle’s Crusade, 17 NAT’L
J. 344 (1992); Owen Ullmann, President Quayle, WASHINGTONIAN, September 1992, at 69.
97. See Finley, supra note 7, at 347-64; Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner:
Triple Play or Double Error? 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 756-59 (1998).
98. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Instead, it interpreted Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as requir-
ing trial judges to be gatekeepers of expert testimony, determining the admissi-
bility of “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” under Rule 702.99
Before allowing a jury to consider expert testimony, trial judges must determine
whether that testimony is relevant and reliable.  The reliability of scientific
proof is determined by its “scientific validity,” which is measured by certain cri-
teria, including testability though scientific methods, presence of absence of
peer-review scrutiny, known or potential rates of error, and level of acceptance
in the scientific community.100
Although the Court’s terse and ambiguous guidance might have allowed the
law to evolve in either direction,101 the Court’s elaboration on the Daubert crite-
ria in General Electric Co. v. Joiner102 clarified the trial judge’s role of ensuring
that any scientific testimony fit the judge’s view of the relevant issues, and this
had the foreseeable effect of increasing lower court scrutiny.103  Dicta in Joiner
suggest that the trial court is obliged to evaluate the scientific validity of an
expert’s conclusions, as opposed to the expert’s methodology.  The Court’s
rejection of the data and methodology employed by the Joiner expert also
accelerated a trend in the lower courts toward aggressive scrutiny of plaintiffs’
expert testimony.104  Finally, Rule 702 has recently been amended to incorporate
the Daubert/Joiner tests.105
99. 509 U.S. at 589-93.
100. Id. at 590 & n.9, 593-95.
101. Some early commentators were convinced that Daubert would result in greater opportunities
for juries to evaluate scientific evidence in toxic tort cases.  See, e.g., Kenneth Chesebro, Taking Dau-
bert’s “Focus” Seriously: The Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994);
Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
1945 (1994).  Many early observers believed, however, that Daubert invited the lower courts to play an
even more aggressive role in evaluating the scientific validity of expert testimony in cases involving
toxic causation.  See, e.g.,  David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139 (1994); Robert F. Blomquist, The Dan-
gers of “General Observations” on Expert Scientific Testimony: A Comment on Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 KY. L.J. 703, 719 (1993-94).  See generally David L. Faigman, The Law’s Sci-
entific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revo-
lution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 663-64 (2000) (noting that “Daubert contained considerable lan-
guage to support the view that more, rather than less, expert testimony might be the result of the
opinion”).  For critiques of the Court’s guidance in Daubert and Joiner, see Beecher-Monas, supra note
37, at 1051-62; Sanders, supra note 41, at 1391-92.
102. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
103. The actual holding of Joiner was that the courts of appeals should not review district court
applications of Daubert excluding scientific testimony with any greater scrutiny than other evidentiary
rulings.
104. 522 U.S. at 146; see also D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What Hath Daubert-Joiner-
Kumho Wrought? 29 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 329 (2001) (arguing that as a result of Dau-
bert/Joiner/Kumho federal trial judges now “play an active role in deciding what expert testimony goes
to the jury”).  Professor Finley reads Joiner to express “a normative judgment that judges are to be
trusted more than juries (and sometimes more than scientists) in areas where law intersects with sci-
ence.”  Finley, supra note 7, at 345.
105. FED. R. EVID. 702.  The Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 702 was amended “in
response to” Daubert and “to the many cases applying Daubert.”
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After more than a decade of experience with Daubert, it is now clear that
the lower courts have applied it vigorously to exclude expert testimony.106  Since
the plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of proof in tort litigation, this aggressive
invocation of the judge’s new role as guardian of the purity of scientific
evidence has had a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs.  With remarkable
speed, judges have gone far beyond throwing the clinical ecologists out of the
courtroom.107  Impressed by artful defense counsels’ smoke screens, they are
now excluding testimony of well-regarded experts.108  A plaintiff’s attorney must
prepare not only to establish an expert’s qualifications, but also to convince a
skeptical trial judge that the testimony supports a scientifically reliable conclu-
sion based upon scientifically reliable data and that the conclusion fits the legal
requirements for establishing cause-in-fact.109  If the plaintiff’s attorney fails,
everyone goes home, and no one knows whether the plaintiff was a victim of
cruel fate or of the defendant’s possibly unconscionable conduct.  If the attor-
ney succeeds, the judge and jury must sit through days of confusing and con-
flicting expert testimony, at the end of which the jury may still decide that the
plaintiff did not carry the burden of proof.
C. The Raul Proposal to Daubertize Judicial Review of Risk Assessment
In a recent American Bar Association-sponsored symposium on “Science,
Agencies, and the Courts,” Alan Raul proposed that courts reviewing agency
106. Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: Does Daubert Deal a
Death Blow To Toxic Tort Plaintiffs? 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 189, 214 (1995) (“[I]t doesn’t take a
rocket scientist to figure out that a four or five part test including ‘general acceptance’ as one factor will
be more difficult to meet than a test based on ‘general acceptance’ alone.”); Faigman, supra note 101, at
664 (concluding that “[e]xperience soon showed, however, that Daubert had the effect of excluding a
lot of evidence that had been admitted previously”); Finley, supra note 7, at 341-42; Joseph Sanders,
The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 391
(1992).  For a general critique of clinical ecology and multiple chemical sensitivity, see Carl H. Johnson,
When Science is Too Daunting: Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, Federal Courts, and the Struggling Spirit
of Daubert, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 322-30 (2000).
107. In the mid-1980s, the science of clinical ecology appeared to be the answer to the causation
conundrum for plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Professor Elliott described the phenomenon as follows:
For a price, some clinical ecologists will testify that exposure to even very small amounts of a
wide range of chemicals suppresses the immune system, thereby weakening the body’s ability
to ward off disease.  This weakening, in turn, allegedly makes the plaintiff vulnerable to virtu-
ally all diseases known to humankind, including “nervousness,” “malaise,” and other condi-
tions that present only subjective symptoms.
E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evi-
dence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 490 (1989); see also Peter Huber, A Comment on Toward Incentive-Based
Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence by E. Donald Elliott, 69 B.U. L. REV.
513, 515 (1989).  Even before Daubert refined their screening function, the courts never seriously enter-
tained claims based heavily upon the testimony of clinical ecologists.  Johnson, supra note 106, at 322-
24.
108. For an excellent example, see Professor Beecher-Monas’s thorough and devastating critique of
the post-Daubert Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d
1105 (8th Cir. 1996).  Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for
Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1637 (2000).
109. See Harvey Brown, Eight Gates For Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999) (detailing
eight “gates” through which a proponent of expert testimony must navigate in order to demonstrate
that the testimony is admissible); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 108.
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risk assessment actions employ “regulatory Daubert” as a principle of judicial
review—”not as a solution, but as a reform to enhance agency decision-making,
to refine judicial review, and to promote accountability.”110  He is perhaps the
strongest, and certainly the most articulate, advocate of this position.  Con-
vinced that legislative and presidential oversight are insufficient to ensure
responsible and accountable decision-making in federal regulatory agencies,
Raul believes that judges must assume a more active role.111  Applying Daubert
principles to judicial review of agency risk assessments would, in Raul’s view,
“promote the full disclosure of all of the agency’s underlying principles,
assumptions, and facts and obligate the agency to come completely clean on the
foundation for its scientific decision.”112  Raul believes more stringent judicial
scrutiny will induce more agency disclosure to the courts and the public.  He is
confident that “[t]he documentation will be better, the explanations will be
better, the defaults, the policy choices, and the uncertainties will all necessarily
be disclosed and subjected to greater scrutiny, because the agency will know
that it’s not going to survive in court if it doesn’t come clean on those factors.”113
To the contrary, judicial adoption of regulatory Daubert will likely result in
unconstrained regulatory policymaking by unaccountable and scientifically illit-
erate judges and in a much higher incidence of judicial remand of important
regulations.  Regulatees will devote greater resources to sponsoring diversion-
ary research.  When adverse scientific studies are published, regulatees will hire
consultants to fill the scientific literature with critical and contrary commentary
that these regulatees will later cite to support claims that the adverse studies are
“fatally flawed.”  Regulatees will attempt to pack advisory committees with
sympathetic scientists in the hope of slipping qualifying language into advisory
committee reports, and they will send industry scientific consultants to advisory
committee meetings to campaign for such qualifying language.  In the end, law-
yers for the regulatees will bring all of this regulatee-generated information to
the attention of credulous judges applying the corpuscular approach required
by stringent regulatory-Daubert review to discredit each study relied upon by
the agency.  The end result will be fewer rules to impede the regulated commu-
nity and fewer protections for the beneficiaries of congressionally mandated
programs.
Although Raul is vague on the details, he believes that the regulatory-Dau-
bert approach would “not only . . . encourage less deference and more probing
judicial review but also . . . establish more consistent standards.”114  Raul assures
us that if the courts adopted that approach, “it wouldn’t always be a roll of the
dice as to which judicial panel you get, or what appellate or district court you’re
110. E. Donald Elliott, Alan Charles Raul, Richard J. Pierce Jr., Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E.
Wagner, Dialogue, Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd? 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,125, 10,129 (2001); see also Raul & Dwyer, supra note 11.
111. Elliott et. al, supra note 110, at 10,131.
112. Id. at 10,130.
113. Id.
114. Id.
MCGARITY.DOC 02/11/04  4:17 PM
172 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:155
before, as to how intensive the judicial review of agency science will be.”115  This
is apparently because even those courts that were previously willing to defer to
the agency resolution of complex science-policy issues would now require that
agency explanations meet judicial standards of scientific adequacy.  The out-
come of appeals would not depend upon the roll of the dice because few courts
would defer to agency expertise.  All courts would be equally hostile to agency
policymaking, and fewer rules would go into effect (although Raul is at pains to
avoid pointing this out).
Even if this is not the scenario that Raul envisions, his argument that
adopting vague Daubert principles of relevance and reliability would bring
about consistency in the lower courts is not persuasive.  Unquestionably, more
cases would get resolved against the agency than under the current “arbitrary
and capricious” standard of review, but it is by no means clear that good agency
decisions would consistently satisfy courts applying Raul’s regulatory-Daubert
principles, while bad agency decisions would be consistently set aside.  The
Daubert principles by no means constrain judicial discretion within discernable
boundaries.  Indeed, the essence of the trial judge’s gatekeeper function under
Daubert is the exercise of judicial discretion over expert testimony that goes
before the jury.  The court of appeals’ function under a regulatory-Daubert
regime is not likely to be less discretionary.  Yet, providing wide latitude to
reviewing judges is hardly a recipe for judicial consistency.
D. The Post-Daubert “Corpuscular” Approach to Conclusions Based on
Scientific Studies
In the wake of Daubert and Joiner, most courts have adopted a
“corpuscular” approach to determining the admissibility of expert testimony in
toxic tort cases.  Under this approach, the party offering expert scientific
testimony must establish the relevance and reliability under the Daubert/Joiner
criteria of each individual study relied upon by the expert as well as the
relevance and reliability of the expert’s overall conclusions.116  If the plaintiff
fails to establish the scientific reliability of a sufficient number of individual
studies, the trial judge will exclude the expert’s testimony and, in the absence of
other relevant and reliable expert testimony on causation, grant a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment before the case ever reaches a jury.  In practice,
this approach places a heavy, particularized burden on the plaintiff and invites
defendants to focus upon flaws in the corpuscles of data underlying the
testimony rather than upon the scientific reliability of the expert’s overall
conclusions.
Epidemiological studies—the primary corpuscles of expert testimony in
toxic tort cases—are exceedingly difficult to conduct in a world where health
115. Id.
116. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 37, at 1057, 1067 (noting that the courts have frequently read
Daubert to require them to sequentially evaluate each study underlying an expert’s conclusion to deter-
mine admissibility).
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and mortality records are notoriously bad, where data must frequently be
drawn from human recollections, and where it is impossible to control against
every possible confounding factor or source of bias.  Consequently, the conclu-
sions of individual epidemiological studies cannot be stated with a high degree
of certainty.  Indeed, the one thing that can be said with a great deal of confi-
dence about epidemiological studies is that they are likely to contain flaws and
potential biases.  The corpuscular approach invites parties seeking to exclude
expert testimony to search every detail of each epidemiological study for possi-
ble flaws and to speculate at great length about confounding factors and other
sources of bias.  Given the practical impossibility of conducting a perfect epi-
demiological study, the search is nearly always fruitful.
Perhaps the best example of the corpuscular approach in action is the major-
ity opinion in Joiner itself.117  In that case, a plaintiff with well-documented
exposure to PCBs offered the testimony of two experts who concluded that
PCB exposure probably caused the plaintiff’s small-cell lung cancer.  In holding
that the appropriate standard of review for a trial court’s admissibility determi-
nations was abuse of discretion, the court addressed the trial judge’s application
of the Daubert criteria to the plaintiff’s expert testimony.  According to the
Court, the testimony of both experts was based primarily upon on a laboratory
animal study and four epidemiological studies, none of which could validly sup-
port a reliable scientific conclusion that PCBs were capable of causing lung
cancer in humans.
The animal study could not validly support that conclusion because the
animals were young (not middle-aged like the plaintiff), the route of admini-
stration was different (direct injection of single doses into the stomach as
opposed to continuous dermal and inhalation exposure), the doses the animals
received were much larger than the plaintiff’s exposure, and the mice developed
a different form of cancer.  Although the Court was willing to entertain the pos-
sibility that a trial court could appropriately admit relevant expert testimony
based upon valid animal studies that were relevant to a plaintiff’s exposure, the
studies in this case “were so dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation
that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the
experts’ reliance on them.”118  In other words, the district court was appropri-
ately performing its Daubert-assigned gatekeeper role when it concluded,
apparently as a matter of sound science, that the plaintiff’s experts could not
validly rely upon the animal study.
The four epidemiological studies upon which the plaintiff’s experts relied
were likewise held scientifically invalid for the purpose of demonstrating that
PCB exposure could cause lung cancer in humans.  The first study, which
looked at workers exposed to PCBs in an Italian capacitor factory, could not
validly support the plaintiff’s experts’ conclusion.  Although the rate of lung
cancer deaths was “higher than might have been expected” in the exposed
117. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
118. Id. at 144-45.
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cohort, the authors of the study concluded that “there were apparently no
grounds for associating lung cancer deaths (although increased above
expectations) and exposure in the plant.”119  Since the authors of the study were
unwilling to conclude that the data in that study demonstrated a causal relation-
ship between PCB exposure and lung cancer, the plaintiff’s experts could not
validly rely upon that study in any way to support a conclusion that there was
such a causal relationship, no matter what additional supporting scientific infor-
mation might be available.
The second study, which examined workers exposed to PCBs at the Mon-
santo Corporation’s Sauget, Illinois, PCB-manufacturing facility, also found the
incidence of lung cancer among those workers to be “somewhat higher” than
would ordinarily be expected.  However, its authors concluded that the increase
was not statistically significant; in their judgment the data did not suggest a link
between PCB exposure and lung cancer.120  Neither the trial court nor the
Supreme Court elaborated on the degree of statistical significance that would
be required to support a valid conclusion that an elevated incidence of lung
cancer in PCB-exposed workers was linked to the exposure.  They were appar-
ently content to rely upon the judgment of the Monsanto scientists who con-
ducted the study.  Therefore, even if they disagreed with the Monsanto scien-
tists as to the level of statistical significance required to support a cause-effect
conclusion, the plaintiff’s experts could not validly rely upon that study to sup-
port an overall conclusion that PCBs cause lung cancer in humans.
Although a third study of Norwegian employees of a cable-manufacturing
plant did report an increase in lung cancer that was statistically significant in the
authors’ view, the plaintiff’s experts could not rely upon it either, because it
made no mention of PCBs and was limited to the particular mineral oil to which
the workers were exposed.121  The court did not address the fact relied upon by
the plaintiff’s experts that many kinds of mineral oil contain PCBs.  The plain-
tiff’s experts apparently had reason to believe that the mineral oil to which the
Norwegian employees were exposed contained PCBs, but because the pub-
lished study made no mention of PCBs, the Court viewed the study as irrele-
vant.
The fourth study appeared at first glance to be the Holy Grail for which the
Court was apparently searching.  The study detected a statistically significant
increase in lung cancer deaths in a PCB-exposed human cohort in Japan.  But
even that study had to be rejected because the “subjects of this study . . . had
been exposed to numerous potential carcinogens, including toxic rice oil that
119. Id. at 145 (quoting Alberto Bertazzi, et al., Cancer Mortality of Capacitor Manufacturing Work-
ers, 11 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 165, 172 (1987)).  Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court inquired
into what might have motivated the authors to conclude that the PCB exposures were not associated
with the lung cancers.
120. Id.  Again, neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court inquired into what might have moti-
vated the authors (who probably undertook the study at the behest of the Monsanto Corporation) to
conclude that the increase in lung cancer was not statistically significant.
121. Id. at 145-46.
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they had ingested.”122  Without relying upon any expert statistical analysis, the
trial judge concluded, apparently as a scientific matter, that this confounding
factor (which is likely to be present in any Japanese cohort) had not been ade-
quately addressed.  The study was therefore also invalid and could not support
an overall conclusion that PCBs cause lung cancer in humans.
As the Joiner case reveals, the corpuscular approach effectively prevents
experts in toxic tort cases from applying the cumulative weight-of-the-evidence
approach universally employed by regulatory agencies in assessing the human
risk posed by toxic substances.123  The weight-of-the-evidence approach focuses
upon the totality of the scientific information and asks whether a cause-effect
conclusion is warranted.  Given that flaws are inevitable in individual studies
and that most studies are not undertaken in anticipation of litigation or the
regulatory process, the weight-of-the-evidence approach necessarily involves
scientific judgments grounded in scientific expertise; and regulatory agencies
are supposed to be repositories of scientific expertise.  The corpuscular
approach to judicial review focuses upon the inevitable flaws in individual
studies and asks whether a sufficient number of relevant studies with suffi-
ciently few flaws remain to support a conclusion that is itself relevant and reli-
able.  Under this approach, a study is either valid or invalid and thus either
relevant or irrelevant to the issue the agency must resolve.  Both determinations
are made by judges who lack scientific expertise.
Courts’ Daubert/Joiner, corpuscular approach to causation is not only dif-
ferent, but arguably much less scientific,124 than that of regulatory agencies
charged with protecting citizens from toxic risks.  A Daubert approach to judi-
cial review of agency risk assessments predictably would be similar.  Ultimately,
agencies would have to defend their regulations in the corpuscular format
adopted in Joiner.  Rather than describe the studies that support a particular
conclusion regarding the risk of human exposure to a toxic substance and assess
those risks under a weight-of-the-evidence approach, an agency would have to
establish the scientific validity of each relevant study, demonstrate its relevance
with scientifically valid reasoning, and convince skeptical judges that the overall
risk assessment is not arbitrary and capricious.
122. Id. at 146.
123. See Brown, supra note 109, at 845 (arguing that, although not specifically addressed in Joiner,
the Court implicitly rejected the weight-of-the-evidence approach); Gottesman, supra note 97, at 769-
70; see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 37, at 1067 (“Although the relevance of a single study may be a
fairly straightforward determination, relevance becomes more complicated when a number of studies
are involved, each of which is only marginally relevant, but which together purport to form the basis of
an expert’s conclusions.”); Finley, supra note 7, at 336 (“Judges have applied Daubert to subject each
item of expert proof proffered by plaintiffs to substantive causation law scrutiny, to see if it, standing
alone, would prove both general and specific causation.”); Sanders, supra note 41, at 1416-17 (criticizing
courts that do not preclude an expert from relying on all of the available evidence).  At least one post-
Daubert court has explicitly rejected an expert’s conclusions based on a weight-of-the-evidence
approach.  See Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1996).
124. See supra note 123.
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E. The “Hard-Look” Doctrine and the Corpuscular Approach
When federal agencies began exercising their rulemaking powers for the
first time in the early 1970s, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia adopted the “hard look” approach to judicial review of informal
rulemaking.125  Under this approach, the courts take a hard look at the adminis-
trative record and the agency’s explanatory material to determine whether the
agency used appropriate analytical methodologies, applied the proper criteria,
considered the relevant factors, chose from among the available regulatory
options, relied upon allowable policies, and pointed to adequate support in the
record for material, empirical propositions.  The hard-look approach rapidly
attracted the courts of appeals126 and the legal academy.127  And, arguably, the
Supreme Court adopted a form of hard-look review in Motor Vehicles Manu-
facturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co,128 in which
it stated that a regulation is arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise.129
The first two elements—whether the agency relied on the wrong factors or
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem—might be labeled pre-
scriptive substantive judicial review.130  Prescriptive review oversees the manner
in which an agency implements its statutory goals as it resolves particular sub-
stantive policy issues.  It includes the analytical methodologies the agency
adopts to resolve certain kinds of issues, the criteria it employs, the factors it
considers, the range of options from which it chooses, and the policies it relies
upon when existing scientific data do not lead to firm factual conclusions.131
125. See JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 142-45 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the evolution of the hard-look doctrine).  Judge Levan-
thal originally coined the term “hard look” to characterize the scrutiny agencies are expected to give to
the contentions of the parties under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pikes Peak Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and to the environmental effects of the parties’ activities
under the National Environmental Policy Act, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972).  Subsequently, the court invoked the hard-look metaphor to characterize the related
judicial function of substantive judicial review of agency rulemaking under the APA’s “arbitrary and
capricious” test.  BONINE & MCGARITY, supra, at 71; see Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman’s
Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning
Comm’n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
126. See supra note 125.
127. Id.
128. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
129. Id. at 42.
130. See Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond the Hard Look: A New Standard for Judicial Review?, 2
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 32 (1986).
131. On science-policy questions generally, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.,
RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 3 (1983); John S.
Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances
Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991); Donald T.  Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992); McGarity, supra
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The second two elements of the State Farm test—whether the agency’s
explanation runs counter to the evidence or is too implausible—might be called
evaluative substantive judicial review.132  This aspect of the State Farm test pre-
sumes that an agency’s “concise general statement of basis and purpose”133 con-
tains explanations for how it resolved important scientific, economic, and tech-
nical questions that arose in the process of promulgating a rule (usually on the
basis of assumptions supplied by the agency).134  It also presumes that the agency
responded to material comments by explaining why it accepted or rejected
them.135  The courts’ role is to determine whether the agency’s technical expla-
nation for how it resolved an important issue, or its response to a critical outside
comment, is inconsistent with the evidence in the rulemaking record or is
implausible under some appropriate (and judicially ascertainable) measure of
plausibility.
The Raul proposal for regulatory-Daubert review would intensify both of
these evaluative and prescriptive functions of judicial review of agency action.
Presumably, the Daubert relevance inquiry would be incorporated into the pre-
scriptive aspect of hard-look review; courts would even more carefully examine
whether the studies an agency relied upon are relevant to the factors Congress
deemed applicable under the particular statutory scheme and might even more
carefully examine the appropriateness of agency resolution of science-policy
questions.
Daubert’s reliability inquiry could easily become incorporated into the
courts’ evaluative review.  Courts would skeptically examine an agency’s “con-
cise general statement” (and perhaps other supporting documents) to deter-
mine whether the agency relied upon a sufficient number of scientifically reli-
able studies to support the conclusions in its risk assessment.  If not, the
agency’s explanation presumably would be considered inconsistent with the
evidence or otherwise implausible.  Again, the inquiry would be more intense
than evaluative review has previously been.  It would not matter how many
studies demonstrated the existence of “smoke,” nor how many studies deemed
scientifically invalid by the court purported to observe “fire”; an agency’s risk
assessment would have to be set aside if the agency had not relied upon a suffi-
cient number of scientifically valid studies in which a cause-effect relationship
was observed.
note 58; Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613
(1995).
132. McGarity, supra note 130.
133. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that all final rules produced through informal
rulemaking procedures be accompanied by a “concise general statement of [the] basis and purpose” of
the rule.  See 42 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
134. See Int’l Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
135. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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The recent opinion of the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking Ass’ns v.
EPA136 provides a good example of how the current hard-look doctrine differs
from the proposed regulatory-Daubert approach.  In American Trucking, vari-
ous industry groups challenged EPA’s newly revised “national ambient air
quality standards” (“NAAQS”) for ozone and fine particulates.  The case even-
tually reached the Supreme Court.  After the Court determined that section 109
of the Clean Air Act137 did not require or permit EPA to engage in cost-benefit
balancing in setting the NAAQS and that, so interpreted, section 109 was not
unconstitutional, it remanded the case for resolution of the remaining claims;138
most of which involved hard-look challenges to the scientific groundings of the
agency’s new standards.  The D.C. Circuit upheld these standards against all
pending challenges.
In their comments on the ozone standard, the petitioners pressed the cor-
puscular approach with particular force, challenging EPA’s reliance on “specific
field, epidemiological, and clinical studies” they deemed invalid.139  In EPA’s
view, these comments “did not reflect an integrative assessment of the evi-
dence—the approach CASAC [the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee]
has historically urged [the agency] to follow—but rather a piecemeal look at
each individual study.”140  The court noted that, for this reason, EPA  “dismissed
the comments, arguing that such an incremental critique ‘tends to miss the
strength of the entire body of evidence taken together.’”141  In upholding EPA’s
interpretation of the totality of the evidence on the effects of ground-level
ozone, the court allowed EPA to rely upon the weight of the evidence.  For
example, because the record was “replete with references to studies demon-
strating the inadequacies of the old one-hour standard,”142 the agency was enti-
tled to rely upon the CASAC’s consensus that, based upon the weight of the
evidence, an eight-hour standard was more appropriate for protecting human
health than the old one-hour standard.
III
FLUE-CURED TOBACCO AS A SIGN OF THINGS TO COME
In Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA,143 the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina upheld a tobacco-
industry challenge to EPA’s risk assessment for environmental tobacco smoke
(“ETS”).  The court of appeals concluded that the risk assessment was not ripe
136. 283 F.3d 355, (D.C. Cir. 2002).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
138. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
139. 283 F.3d at 377.
140. Id. (quoting Ozone NAAQS, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,866 (July 18, 1997)).
141. Id. (citing Ozone NAAQS, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,866).
142. Id. at 378.
143. 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998), vacated and remanded by 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
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for judicial review and vacated the district court’s judgment.144  But the skepti-
cism the lower court demonstrated toward EPA’s scientific assessments, the
credulity with which it accepted the assertions of the tobacco industry’s scien-
tific consultants, and the corpuscular approach it took respecting studies under-
lying the risk assessment make Flue-Cured Tobacco an example of things to
come if the courts adopt a regulatory-Daubert approach to judicial review of
agency risk assessment.  Flue-Cured Tobacco is also an ideal case study because
of the availability of an extraordinary database of thirty-three million internal
tobacco-industry documents resulting from the tobacco litigation that now
allows scholars to observe first-hand an industry’s attempt to bend science to its
litigative and regulatory needs.  The following case analysis draws upon this
database to explore the industry’s decade-long efforts to cast doubt upon EPA’s
ETS risk assessment initiative.
A. The Industry Trashes Hirayama
In January 1981, the British Medical Journal published recently compiled
and analyzed data from an ongoing prospective cohort study of the relationship
between smoking and health conducted by Japanese epidemiologist Takeshi
Hirayama.  The study tracked the incidence of lung cancer in more than 90,000
nonsmoking wives of Japanese smokers between 1966 and 1979.145  Hirayama
concluded that a smoking husband increased his wife’s risk of contracting lung
cancer to between one-third and one-half that of a smoker.146  Hirayama
detected no association, however, between spousal smoking and the wife’s risk
of dying from other diseases like “stomach cancer, cervical cancer, and ischae-
mic heart disease.”147  To Hirayama, the results indicated “the possible impor-
tance of passive or indirect smoking as one of the causal factors of lung
cancer.”148
Shortly after the publication of Hirayama’s study, the International Journal
of Cancer published a much smaller case-control study by a team headed by
Dimitrios Trichopoulos of the University of Athens School of Medicine.149
Trichopoulos and his colleagues interviewed fifty-one women with lung cancer
144. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
145. Takeshi Hirayama, Non-Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung
Cancer: A Study from Japan, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 183 (1981).  Prior to the Hirayama and Trichopoulos
studies, only one of several epidemiological examinations of adverse health effects of smoking in non-
smokers had found a statistically significant correlation.  In 1979, Drs. White and Froeb published a
study in the New England Journal of Medicine concluding that exposure to tobacco smoke in the work-
place over a period of twenty years or more caused a dysfunction of the small airways in nonsmokers’
lungs, as indicated by measuring forced exhalation volume.  James R. White & Herman F. Froeb,
Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers Chronically Exposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 720 (1980).  While that study concerned the tobacco industry enough for it to pay for numerous
scientific critiques, it did not pose nearly the threat that Dr. Hirayama’s study did.
146. Id. at 183.  The risk was “particularly great in agricultural families when the husbands were
aged 40-59” at the beginning of the study.  Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Dimitrios Trichopoulos et al., Lung Cancer and Passive Smoking, 27 INT’L J. CANCER 1 (1981).
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and 163 other hospital patients regarding the smoking habits of their husbands.
The study concluded that among the nonsmoking women there was a “statisti-
cally significant difference between the cancer cases and the other patients with
respect to their husbands’ smoking habits.”150  The relative risk for nonsmokers
with husbands who smoked less than one pack a day was 2.4 compared to a 3.4
relative risk for nonsmoking wives of men who smoked more than one pack per
day.151
A memorandum prepared for the Tobacco Institute Executive Committee
meeting of May 19, 1981, stated the relevance of the two studies to the tobacco
industry in stark terms: “The Hirayama study and the Greek study which con-
clude that smoking causes cancer in nonsmokers may be the most damaging sci-
entific articles in the history of our industry.”152  If smoking posed a risk to non-
smokers, reasonable accommodation was no longer a credible answer to
complaints about public smoking, and the tobacco industry was in serious trou-
ble.
1.  Initial Response to the Hirayama and Trichopoulos Studies
The industry became aware of both studies several months in advance of
publication.  On August 13, 1980, an R.J. Reynolds (“RJR”) scientist responded
to Hirayama’s presentation of his results at a scientific gathering in Helsinki:153
although Hirayama was “the best known of Japan’s cancer epidemiologists,”
the data were “generally considered not to be of high caliber” and could
“probably be ‘explained’ because they were not corrected for ‘confounding
variables.’”154
The industry began drafting plans in advance for responding to the study
once published.  Warren Donahue, a Philip Morris public relations specialist,
warned that the company’s response “must not be angry counterattack, but
calm, reasoned, and confident statements.”155  Soon after the Hirayama and
Trichopoulos studies appeared in print, the tobacco industry launched a major
initiative to undermine the scientific bases for their conclusions. The Tobacco
Institute’s  Scientific Affairs Division prepared a critical assessment of the Hira-
150. Id.  The authors noted that a study of Greek women was especially appropriate because for
more than twenty years Greek men had smoked heavily while Greek women rarely smoked.  Id. at 3.
151. Id.
152. J.K.W., Outline for TI Meeting on May 19, 1981 (undated) (Bates No. 680543057).  The Bates
numbers referenced throughout this Article are unique numbers that are consistent among the various
online and print collections of the tobacco-industry documents.  These documents are contained in the
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, maintained by the University of California, and all industry
documents referenced in this Article are available at that website.  See Legacy Tobacco Documents
Library, at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/ (last visited July 1, 2003).
153. Memorandum from Frank G. Colby to Dr. Alan Rodgman (Aug. 13, 1980) (Bates No.
19800813).  The industry also had early notification of the Trichopoulos study.  Trichopoulos submitted
his study for publication on October 15, 1980, and by December the tobacco industry had obtained a
copy of the study’s galley proofs.  See Galley Proofs, Dimitrios Trichopoulos et al., Lung Cancer and
Passive Smoking (Dec. 12, 1980) (Bates No. 521027372).
154. Memorandum from Frank G. Colby to Dr. Alan Rodgman, supra note 153.
155. Memorandum from Warren Donahue to Frank Saunders 2 (undated) (Bates No. 2021278875).
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yama study highlighting several weaknesses.156  The mortality statistics, assem-
bled from death certificates (as was the case with most epidemiological studies
of that time), were “known to contain many diagnostic inaccuracies.”157  The
study did not attempt to determine the length of exposure to tobacco smoke
through a measure such as “person years at risk”;158 in other words, the study did
not attempt to calculate the “degree of exposure these women had to cigarette
smoke.”159  Finally, the Hirayama study did not account for confounding factors
like the use of charcoal hibachis for cooking and heating in Japan, the tendency
for rural families to spend more time outdoors, the “inadvertent characteristic
of Japanese homes (especially in rural areas) to be well-ventilated,” or “the fact
that a heavy smoker may do most of his smoking on the job or in the local pub
rather than at home.”160
A lengthy internal Philip Morris critique noted “the comparatively large
number of unmarried women with lung cancer.”161  If the same proportion of
unmarried Japanese women smoked as Japanese women in general, the associa-
tion Hirayama purported to find between lung cancer and passive smoking
would “probably be reversed dramatically.”162  Furthermore, it was not clear
that Hirayama had corrected for “social class and/or income.”163  The memo also
complained that the original data were collected by census takers who were not
trained in epidemiology.164  The goal, the memo concluded, was to obtain and
reanalyze Hirayama’s raw data.  In so doing, the industry might inquire of
fellow scientists at the Japan Tobacco and Salt Monopoly whether the data
“could be subpoena[e]d and/or whether the Japan and U.S. and/or other Indus-
try organizations could work together ‘unraveling’ Hirayama’s public smoking
allegations.”165
The industry criticisms were potentially valid, but similar concerns could be
raised about virtually any epidemiological study.  There is always another piece
of information a study instrument could have demanded and another potential
confounding factor for which a study could have controlled.  In many cases,
however, the needed information is exceedingly difficult to obtain.  Should
Hirayama have validated the death certificates he relied upon though some
156. Memorandum from Scientific Affairs Division to Horace R. Kornegay, Recent Hirayama
Paper (Jan. 26, 1981) (Bates No. 2024955077).  The Institute worked the criticisms detailed in the
memo into a brief “backgrounder” that it sent out to answer initial press inquiries.  Telex from Robert
H. Bockman to W. Campbell (Jan. 28, 1981) (Bates No. 2024182984).
157. Memorandum from Scientific Affairs Division to Horace R. Kornegay, supra note 156, at 2.
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Memorandum, Non-Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer: A
Study from Japan: A Critique 1 (Jan. 27, 1981) (Bates No. 1002647454).
162. Id.  The memo also noted that the conclusion that there was a higher incidence of lung cancer
among women in rural versus non-rural areas seemed “contrary to other alleged epidemiological find-
ings.”  Id. at 2.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 4.
MCGARITY.DOC 02/11/04  4:17 PM
182 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:155
verification tool?  Should the instrument have attempted to ascertain how long
a wife’s husband had been smoking, how much time the husband spent at home,
and how frequently the husband smoked when at home?  Should the inter-
viewer have asked the wife how frequently she cooked on an hibachi, how
drafty her house was, and how much time her husband spent at the pub?  That
the answer to some, or even most, of these questions might be “yes” does not
necessarily undermine Dr. Hirayama’s conclusions.  Questions that might
render an epidemiological study invalid under the corpuscular approach do not
preclude its consideration under a weight-of-the-evidence approach, though the
number and nature of outstanding questions might suggest how much weight
the study should receive.
One of the tobacco-industry consultants who commented on the paper
within days of its publication was Peter N. Lee—a statistician retained by the
British tobacco industry’s trade association, the Tobacco Advisory Council
(“TAC”), to prepare unsolicited analyses of relevant scientific studies as they
appeared in the literature.166  Lee noted that “[t]he importance of Hirayama’s
paper . . . [was] obvious[,] especially as it [came] from an epidemiologist of
repute and [was] based on a very large data base of over 265,000 adults followed
for 14 years.”167  Lee observed, however, that the analyses were standardized for
the age of the husband but not the wife.  If the nonsmoking wives of smokers
tended to be older than nonsmoking wives of nonsmokers in Japan, age alone
might have accounted for the increased lung cancer in the first group.  Yet if
this were the case, the effect should have shown up for all age-related diseases
and not just lung cancer.168  The bottom line was that “Hirayama’s estimate of
the significance of [the] risk ratio using the Mantel-extension [Chi] test
appear[ed] correct.”169  Despite its shortcomings, it was “difficult to argue that
the study was fundamentally flawed.”170
Nevertheless, Lee found Hirayama’s conclusion that passive smoking caused
lung cancer “hard to accept [considering the] relative dose of smoke constitu-
ents taken in by active and passive smokers.”171  Even if the data supported the
conclusion, Lee questioned its applicability to the Western world, with its
markedly different mortality patterns.172  Finally, Lee noted that Lawrence Gar-
finkel, an epidemiologist working on the American Cancer Society’s ongoing
large-scale epidemiological study, had told Lee that his data showed no adverse
166. P.N. Lee, Paper by Dr. T. Hirayama in the British Medical Journal, 17th January 1981 “Non-
Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer: A Study from Japan”: First
Comments (Jan. 20, 1981) (Bates No. 521024694).
167. Id. at 1.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id.  Lee disagreed, however, with application of the Mantel test to support the conclusion that
“the risk associated with passive smoking is particularly marked in wives of young agricultural work-
ers.”  Id.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Lee, supra note 166, at 3.
172. Id.
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effect from passive smoking.173  Lee speculated that “Garfinkel’s findings, based
on a larger study[] and taking into account a wide range of co-factors[,] may
turn out to be of greater scientific value.”174
Although Lee was on the payroll of the British tobacco industry, his analysis
was surprisingly balanced.  He suggested that the Hirayama study would not
fare well when compared to the larger Garfinkel study, which by its nature
would be more relevant to the American and British populations, but he also
found many reasons to give the study at least modest weight.  While cautioning
that Hirayama’s study should not be taken authoritatively without additional
evidence, he nevertheless refused to conclude that it was fundamentally flawed
from a statistical perspective.  A carefully nuanced critique was not, however,
what the U.S. tobacco industry wanted to hear.
On January 27, 1981, Lee reported to the Research Committee of the Brit-
ish Tobacco Advisory Council that neither Dr. Garfinkel nor Dr. Nicholas
Wald, a well-regarded Oxford epidemiologist, had any “solid evidence on which
to refute [Hirayama’s] conclusions.”175  The committee members noted that “in
addition to any criticisms of a purely scientific nature, it was necessary to take
account of the marked differences in the social life of the Japanese compared
with countries in the West.”176  In addition, they cautioned Lee that “from a
public relations point of view, [it was important] to widen the issues by taking
account of other factors likely to be involved in the different patterns of cancer
in the different communities.”177
The U.S. tobacco industry also sought Lee’s advice.  An analysis of data
prepared by Frank C. Colby, an RJR statistician, with the help of Dr. Marvin
Kastenbaum,178 chief statistician for the U.S. Tobacco Institute (“TI”), con-
cluded that if unmarried nonsmoking Japanese women were included in the
173. Id.
174. Id.  Five days later, in a paper entitled “Some Further Comments,” Lee noted that the overall
increase in lung cancer among all women in Japan indicated that other factors (perhaps air pollution)
“must be of substantial importance in Japanese lung cancer aetiology. . . .  In any event the large con-
tribution of nonsmoking factors would appear to add to the reason for not taking Hirayama’s findings
as gospel without other evidence.”  P.N. Lee, Paper by Dr. T. Hirayama: Some Further Comments
(Jan. 25, 1981) (Bates No. 504886135).
175. Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the Research Committee of T.A.C. Held at 11:00 a.m. on Tues-
day, 27th January 1981 at Glen House, Stag Place, London SWIE 5AG, at 4 (Jan. 27, 1981) (Bates No.
2025017011).
176. Id.
177. Id.  On February 10, 1981, Lee prepared another analysis in which he concluded that “if the
passive smoking really does lead to a doubling in the risk of lung cancer, then it is equivalent to active
smoking of at least three cigarettes a day in the Japanese situation.”  P.N. Lee, Relative Effects of
Active and Passive Smoking: Some Mathematical Considerations (Feb. 10, 1981) (Bates No.
504867953).  To Lee, this seemed “very high . . . when viewed against evidence on smoke uptake in
extreme passive smoking situations.”  Id.  This led Lee to the “strong suspicion that some biasing factor
is involved, though what this could be is not at all clear.”  Lee speculated that the search for this biasing
factor “may lead to something which might explain part of the smoking/lung cancer relationship itself.
An intriguing thought!”  Id.  An intriguing thought, perhaps, but not one that the tobacco industry was
anxious to pursue.
178. See Memorandum from Marvin Kastenbaum to Frank Colby (Feb. 20, 1981) (Bates No.
504886141).
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category of nonsmoking women who were married to nonsmokers, the differ-
ence in lung cancer rates disappeared.179  Asked to comment on Colby’s memo,
Lee observed that adding unmarried women to the class of women married to
nonsmokers would be inappropriate unless the data were carefully adjusted for
age because men die faster than women.180  Furthermore, Dr. Lee disagreed with
Colby’s calculations, and he provided detailed calculations of his own.181  Appar-
ently, Dr. Lee’s rebuttal was sufficient to dissuade Dr. Colby from pursuing the
matter further.  Dr. Kastenbaum, however, was not so easily discouraged.
The TI prepared a quick response to the Trichopoulos study.182  Noting the
small number of subjects included in the study, TI scientists found it impossible
to draw valid inferences without better information about the sample popula-
tions.183  Since at least eighteen of the fifty-one lung cancers had been clinically
diagnosed without laboratory verification, it was impossible to tell whether they
were primary lung cancers or had metastasized from some other part of the
body.184  In addition, Trichopoulos failed to control for all possible confounding
factors, including “genetic predisposition and family history of disease, occupa-
tional exposures, socio-economic status and stress.”185  Finally, the study failed
to determine the actual number of cigarettes smoked in the home and ignored
the possibility that husbands might have limited their smoking to places primar-
ily outside the home such as “the local taverna.”186
2.  Confronting Hirayama Directly
On March 2, 1981, Kastenbaum wrote Dr. Hirayama directly, requesting
answers to sixteen specific questions.187  Some of the demands were altogether
reasonable.  For example, Kastenbaum asked for a copy of the Hirayama’s
questionnaire, further amplification on some definitional issues, and clarifica-
tion as to whether certain categories in his tables included nonmarried
women.188  Other requests would have required Hirayama to expend a great deal
of effort.  For example, Kastenbaum asked for fifteen years’ worth of informa-
tion concerning who gathered the data, the type of training they received, and
179. Memorandum from Frank C. Colby to Max H. Crohn, Jr. 2 (Feb. 3, 1981) (Bates No.
506641713).  A Philip Morris statistician reached the same conclusion.  See supra text accompanying
note 161.
180. P.N. Lee, Hirayama Passive Smoking Study: Some Comments on the Critique by Colby 1 (Feb.
19, 1981) (Bates No. 504886335).
181. Id. at 1-5.
182. Tobacco Institute, Background for Response to Trichopoulos Paper (Feb. 6, 1981) (Bates No.
1002623175).
183. Id. at 1.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.  Dr. Colby also examined the Trichopoulos study and concluded that it was “based on even
flimsier data than the Hirayama study.”  Memorandum from Frank C. Colby to Max H. Crohn, supra
note 179, at 5.
187. Letter from Marvin A. Kastenbaum to Takeshi Hirayama (Mar. 2, 1981) (Bates No.
503947528).
188. Id. at 1-3.
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the location of all demographic histories.189  Additionally, Kastenbaum
requested a copy of all of Hirayama’s raw data, preferably in computer-friendly
form.190  Many of the questions were plainly argumentative in nature and were
not asked with any realistic expectation of response.191
The German Verband, Germany’s equivalent of the Tobacco Institute,
arranged for Peter Lee and Dr. Franz Adlkofer, a German tobacco-industry
scientist, to meet with Hirayama during the last week of April, 1981.192  Adlkofer
and Lee first met for an hour with Hirayama’s boss, Dr. Sugimura.193  Dr. Sugi-
mura was “remarkably frank” about Hirayama’s work on ETS, suggesting that
Hirayama was “over ready to jump into publication without adequate scientific
discussion first.”194  He speculated that the dose Japanese women would have
received from their husbands’ smoke would be very low because Japanese
married men were typically at home for only ten hours per day, eight of which
they spent sleeping.195
Adlkofer and Lee then met for seven hours with Hirayama himself.  Hira-
yama impressed Lee “as being more of an open-minded scientist than might
have been expected.”196  He was “very frank and answered all our questions very
fully and without any hint that he was at all annoyed by our difficulties in
accepting the conclusions of his study.”197  Significantly, Hirayama “did not con-
sider it proved that passive smoking increased the risk of lung cancer.”198  He
believed that his paper, together with the Trichopoulos publication, generated
“a hypothesis that required further confirmation before it could be accepted.”199
Hirayama welcomed the forthcoming Garfinkel paper and hoped it might
remove some of the “media pressure” and “allow further research to be carried
out more peacefully.”200  He did not believe, however, that it refuted his own
work.201
189. Id. at 2.  Kastenbaum demanded “a record of deaths by age, sex and other available character-
istics” and “the age distribution of [his] subjects by sex and smoking class, as of 1965 and at any other
point in time.”  Id.
190. Id. at 1.
191. For example, Kastenbaum asked Hirayama how he reconciled his reliance on death certificates
with other Japanese studies on the accuracy of such death-certificate based studies, how he assessed the
reliability of self-reporting of smoking habits in light of serious questions that had been raised in the
scientific literature on self-reporting, id. at 1-2, and how he reconciled his 8.7 per 100,000 mortality rate
for nonsmoking wives of nonsmoking husbands with the 5.7 per 100,000 overall Japanese mortality as
determined by the American Cancer Society, id. at 3.
192. Letter from Takeshi Hirayama to Dr. D. Schmahl (Feb. 16, 1981) (Bates No. 1000120121).
193. P.N. Lee, Notes on Visit to Japan: April 24th to May 1st, 1981 (Apr. 5, 1981) (Bates No.
504798208).
194. Id. at 1-2.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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None of Hirayama’s responses indicated “any major biasing or confounding
factors which might explain the association seen between passive smoking and
lung cancer.”202  In particular, social class, a factor strongly alluded to by many
of the tobacco-industry scientists, “did not alter the picture materially.”203
Similarly, Hirayama adequately controlled for air pollution and population den-
sity.204  Hirayama also had good answers to questions about the frequency of
smoking among Japanese husbands and the reliability of self-reported smoking
habits.205  Lee further divined from his conversation with Hirayama that industry
scientists had misunderstood Hirayama’s data and had erroneously concluded
that death rates of unmarried nonsmoking women were considerably higher
than those of married, nonsmoking women.206  Although Lee still believed that
Hirayama’s conclusion that passive smoking caused lung cancer was
“implausible,”207 he noted that “no possible biasing or confounding factor
considered so far” explained the results.208
3.  Letters to Scientific Journals
Soon after the publication of Hirayama’s paper, the medical journals began
to receive letters from tobacco-industry consultants.209  On March 21, 1981, the
British Medical Journal, the journal that had originally published Hirayama’s
paper, published a detailed letter from German epidemiologist Martin Rutsch,
who purported to find “apparent inconsistencies” within the subpopulation of
unmarried women and the “alleged” difference between urban and rural popu-
lations.210  In light of these discrepancies, he found Hirayama’s conclusions to be
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id. at 7.
207. P.N. Lee, Notes on Visit to Japan: April 24th to May 1st, 1981, Summary of Our Main Findings
(Apr. 5, 1981) (Bates No. 504798226).
208. Id.  Adlkofer’s impressions of the meeting were somewhat less positive than Lee’s.  Memoran-
dum from Frank G. Colby, Telephone Call from Prof. Adlkofer on May 11, 1981 to FGC on Hirayama
Public Smoking Study (May 26, 1981) (Bates No. 503681397).  Although he believed that Hirayama’s
philosophy was “very prejudicially anti-smoking,” he did not believe that Hirayama was such a
“fanatic” that he would “actually falsify figures.”  Id. at 1.  Adlkofer believed that Hirayama was “a
very rigid epidemiologist” who was unprepared to weigh “physiological and biological realities” in
interpreting his raw data.  Id.
209. Some of the letters consisted of broad complaints, rather than detailed critiques.  For example,
in a letter to the British journal New Scientist, tobacco-industry consultant H.J. Eysenck opined that
until Hirayama supplied additional information on his studies, he would “hesitate to come to any firm
decision.”  H.J. Eysenck, More Smoke, 89 NEW SCIENTIST 494 (1981).  At the time that he wrote this
letter, Dr. Eysenck was one of the scientists receiving payments from “Special Account # 4,” which was
administered by the Committee of Counsel of the U.S. Tobacco Industry.  He had been paid $14,421
for the six months ending on February 28, 1981.  Greenspan & Yellon, P.C., Audit of Jacob, Meidinger
& Finnegan, Special Account # 4 (Feb. 28, 1981) (Bates No. 2015042074).
210. Martin Rutsch, Non-Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer,
282 BRIT. MED. J. 985 (1981).
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“problematic.”211  Hirayama later published a response to Rutsch in which he
demonstrated that lung cancer rates were virtually identical in married and
unmarried nonsmoking women, thus refuting Rutsch’s allegations of inconsis-
tencies.212
The British Medical Journal also published a critical letter from long-time
tobacco-industry consultant Theodor D. Sterling, complaining that Hirayama
had failed to consider the exposure of Japanese women to indoor air pollution
from household heating and cooking equipment.213  Since smoke from wood
fires had “been suggested as a factor in lung cancer etiology” and since cooking
with kerosene stoves had “been associated with lung cancer in women in Hong
Kong,” Hirayama’s data would be suspect if more nonsmoking wives of smok-
ing husbands employed those fuels for heating and cooking than nonsmoking
wives of nonsmoking husbands.  Sterling thought there was good reason to
believe this to be the case because a greater proportion of Japanese smokers
belonged to the lower classes.214
Although Hirayama agreed that Sterling’s suggestion “should be explored
further,” he noted that a recent Japanese study concluded that “there was no
increased use of kerosene stoves in households where the husbands smoked.”215
Moreover, he controlled for socio-economic class and found that there was a
slightly higher incidence of smoking among males in the higher socio-economic
classes.216  Thus, Hirayama demonstrated that it can be much easier to come up
with plausible-sounding theories about confounding factors than it is to produce
hard evidence demonstrating their real-world existence.  Sterling, however,
knew how the doubt-casting game was played, and for many years he main-
tained that confounding factors accounted for the association between primary
smoking and lung cancer.217
211. Id.  After his meeting with Hirayama, Peter Lee concluded that Rutsch’s first point was based
upon a misinterpretation of Hirayama’s data and was not well taken.  Lee, supra note 193, at 7.  Lee did
not, however, attempt to correct Rutsch’s mistake publicly.
212. Takeshi Hirayama, Letter to the Editor, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 1393 (1981).
213. Theodor D. Sterling, Communication, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 1156 (1981).
214. Id.
215. Hirayama, supra note 212.  Although the tobacco industry continued to make much of the
cooking habits of Japanese women, other scientists working for the tobacco industry regarded “the
kerosene stove ‘issue’” to be “merely a debating point, and not an important criticism.”  Memorandum
from Frank G. Colby to Max H. Crohn, Jr., Critique of Dr. Hirayama’s Comments on Letters to the
Editor Critiquing his Paper on Lung Cancer in Non-smoking Wives of Japanese Smokers (May 21,
1981) (Bates No. 504886999).
216. Hirayama, supra note 212.
217. Dr. Peter J. Burch of the Department of Medical Physics at the Leeds General Infirmary
offered a unique critique of the Hirayama study.  He suggested that the results were explainable by the
hypothesis that “women who marry smokers are more likely to be genetically predisposed to lung
cancer than those who marry non-smokers.”  Peter J. Burch, Passive Smoking and Lung Cancer, 282
BRIT. MED. J. 1393 (1981).  This hypothesis would, in his view, explain both the data and the Rutsch
critique.  Because the habit was “openly allowed in the society,” he could “conceive of no influence on
the selection of partners.”  Id.  Hirayama responded that Burch’s theory—that the choice of a marriage
partner involves one or more factors that are associated with smoking—was apparently not true in
Japan “where mating has surely been random at least in terms of smoking.”  Hirayama, supra note 212.
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Not all the commentary on the Hirayama study was critical.  In a review
article for Environmental Research featuring the Hirayama and Trichopoulos
studies, E. Cuyler Hammond of the American Cancer Society and Irving J.
Selikoff of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine opined that Hirayama ade-
quately controlled for confounding factors.218  Although the authors worried that
the index Hirayama used to estimate passive-smoke exposure was suspect
because some husbands probably smoked more at home than elsewhere,219 any
inaccuracy was more likely to weaken the association than enhance it.220  Simi-
larly, while Hirayama failed to describe his age-standardization method, any
resulting bias would likely have tended to reduce the appearance of an upward
trend.221  Finally, although Hirayama did not verify his subjects’ cause of death,
there was no reason to suspect that error in recording the cause of death on the
death certificates of the deceased would be connected with the smoking habits
of their husbands.222  Hammond and Selikoff could identify “no sound reason”
to suspect Hirayama’s findings “were due entirely to errors, biases, or con-
founding factors of some sort.”223  Still, they wanted more positive evidence—
though “perhaps not a great deal more”—before they were willing to conclude
that passive smoking causes lung cancer.224
4.  The Mantel Critique and the Garfinkel Study
Two independent developments came together in June 1981 to give the
tobacco industry a unique opportunity for deconstructing the Hirayama and
Trichopoulos studies.  First, Dr. Lawrence Garfinkel of the American Cancer
Society published a long-anticipated study.  Analyzing the huge multi-year data-
base assembled by E. Culyer Hammond, the industry’s arch-nemesis, Garfinkel
found no statistically significant increase in lung cancer among nonsmoking
wives of smokers.  Second, Dr. Kastenbaum of the Tobacco Institute discovered
another anomaly in the Hirayama paper that led him to conclude that Hirayama
had made a statistical error.  The TI then hired Dr. Nathan Mantel, a former
National Cancer Institute statistician who had developed the statistical method-
ology used by Dr. Hirayama, to examine whether Kastenbaum’s critique
appeared reasonable.  The tobacco industry’s strategic use of the Garfinkel
study and Dr. Mantel’s expertise is an ideal example of the corpuscular
218. E. Cuyler Hammond & Irving J. Selikoff, Passive Smoking and Lung Cancer with Comments
on Two New Papers, 24 ENVTL. RES. 444 (1981).
219. Id. at 449.
220. Id.
221. Hammond & Selikoff, supra note 218, at 449.
222. Id.
223. Id.  The Trichopoulos study, according to Hammond and Selikoff, was “a small but very
interesting case-control study.” Id. at 450.  They found the trends to be “in general agreement with
findings.”  Id.  The procedures for classifying women by the smoking habits of their husbands seemed
reasonable, and the control group appeared to be well chosen.  Id. at 450-51.  Beyond the obvious
implications for public policy, the authors noted that the passive-smoking data supported the hypothe-
sis that the carcinogenesis dose-response curve was, at very low doses, not linear but logistic in shape.
Id. at 452.
224. Hammond & Selikoff, supra note 218, at 452.
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approach in action.
The industry got wind of Garfinkel’s conclusions long before their June
publication.225  Concluding that the paper could, if properly publicized, kill the
troublesome passive-smoking issue,226 the TI’s public relations director solicited
“the best and senior brains” at the public relations firm Burson-Marsteller to
come up with a plan to “off-set the recent[,] widely publicized findings of Hira-
yama.”227  On the day of publication, the TI’s public relations department would
distribute a lawyer-approved press release to the media.228  The TI’s federal and
administration departments had tested media-pickup possibilities by conducting
dry runs in the April and May issues of the Journal of the National Cancer Insti-
tute.229  The TI’s state-relations department would develop a “field distribution
plan” that would target state legislators who relied upon the Hirayama study to
support passive-smoking legislation.230  It would also work with volunteers from
the industry’s grassroots Tobacco Action Network to solicit letters to the
editors of local and regional newspapers “underscoring how the new report
cancels the old one.”231  The industry’s Council on Tobacco Research and the
Shook Hardy law firm would provide scientists to underscore in the media the
significance of the Garfinkel study.232  A select group of these scientists would
accompany the TI’s “media tour [of] ten major markets to merchandise [the]
Garfinkel findings.”233
Meanwhile, a discussion with Professor Chris P. Tsokos, a statistician and
industry consultant at the University of South Florida, led Dr. Kastenbaum to
conclude that the Hirayama paper contained a “fundamental error.”234  Apply-
ing the “Mantel-extension chi test” to the Hirayama data, Kastenbaum con-
cluded there was “not a statistically significant dose-response relationship
between lung cancer rates for nonsmoking wives and the level of smoking in
their husbands.”235  Kastenbaum speculated that Hirayama had forgotten to take
the square root of a critical number and had therefore reported a chi-squared
value, rather than the required chi value.  Given this serious blunder, Hira-
225. See Memorandum from Frank C. Colby to Max H. Crohn, Jr., supra note 179, at 5 (noting that
Garfinkel had submitted his study for publication in January, 1981, and that Garfinkel came “exactly to
the opposite conclusions as Dr. Hirayama”).
226. Letter from William Kloepfer, Jr. to Jim Carr (May 1, 1981) (Bates No. 521024170).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1.  The press release was ultimately approved by both Shook Hardy and Covington &
Burling.  Memorandum from Samuel D. Chilcote, Jr. to Members of the Executive Committee 1 (May
29, 1981) (Bates No. TIFL 0062181).
229. Memorandum from Samuel D. Chilcote, Jr. to TI Operations Committee 1 (May 11, 1981)
[hereinafter Chilcote-TI Memorandum].
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2.
232. Id. at 2.
233. Id.
234. Memorandum from Marvin A. Kastenbaum to Horace Kornegay, Meeting with Prof. C.
Tsokos Concerning the Hirayama Paper (June 1, 1981) (Bates No. TI0427-2891); Memorandum from
Marvin A. Kastenbaum to Horace Kornegay, Suspected Error in the Hirayama Paper (June 1, 1981)
(Bates No. TIBR0016526) [hereinafter Suspected Error Memorandum].
235. Suspected Error Memorandum, supra note 234, at 1.
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yama’s conclusions were “not scientifically or statistically sound.”236  To be on
the safe side, however, Kastenbaum decided to consult with Dr. Nathan Mantel,
the creator of the statistical test, “to seek an independent evaluation of the
results.”237
Although unwilling to conclude that Hirayama had committed a mathemati-
cal error, Mantel agreed that the published report at least raised the question
“whether Hirayama has conducted a more refined analysis about which he is
giving us no clues, or he has mistakenly interpreted his chi-square[d] value as a
chi value.”238  Although a “[m]uch more careful analysis of the data would be
needed” to know for certain, Mantel was at least willing to entertain the possi-
bility that Hirayama had made a critical mistake.239  It was by no means a sting-
ing critique, but it came from a credible source.240
Without attempting to contact Dr. Hirayama for an explanation, the
Tobacco Institute initiated an aggressive public relations blitz “to discredit Dr.
Hirayama’s [paper].”241  The TI’s public relations department planned a “one-
two punch”242 strategy under which Burson-Marsteller would publicize Dr. Kas-
tenbaum’s allegations on Friday for the weekend press and then initiate a sec-
ond wave of press releases to accompany the publication of the Garfinkel study,
which was expected soon thereafter.243
The Tobacco Institute threw the first punch on June 10, when its chairman,
Horace Kornegay, sent a telegram to Hirayama’s boss, Dr. Sugimura, notifying
him of the “very grave” error Dr. Kastenbaum had discovered.244  Copies of the
telegram were provided to Dr. Hirayama, the British Medical Journal, and the
press.245  Simultaneously, a lawyer-approved press release announced that Drs.
Mantel and Tsokas had “confirmed the existence of a fundamental mathemati-
cal error” in the Hirayama study.246  The release stated that the study had “been
used to support unnecessary limitations on individual liberties.”247  The TI public
relations department also distributed a packet on the Mantel critique to the
236. Id.
237. Id. at 4.
238. Letter from Nathan Mantel to Marvin A. Kastenbaum (June 5, 1981) (Bates No.
TINY0020382).
239. Id. at 2.
240. Professor Tsokos agreed with Dr. Kastenbaum that Hirayama made an erroneous calculation.
Tsokos’s application of the Mantel procedure to the data as he interpreted them “fail[ed] to confirm
the conclusion that non-smoking wives of heavy smokers have a higher risk of lung cancer.”  Letter
from Chris P. Tsokos to Horace R. Kornegay 2 (June 9, 1981) (Bates No. TI0427-2884).
241. Memorandum from the Tobacco Institute to Executive Committee and Stan Temko (June 1,
1981) (Bates No. 500651593).
242. Telex from William Kloepfer, Jr. to Mary Covington (June 10, 1981) (Bates No. 500875018).
243. Memorandum from Sam Chilcote to James C. Bowling et al. (June 11, 1981) (Bates No.
TI1190-3142).
244. Telegram from Horace Kornegay to Dr. T. Sugimura (June 10, 1981) (Bates No.
TINY0020599).
245. Id.
246. News Release from the Tobacco Institute for Immediate Use Accompanied by Text of Cable-
gram to Japan and Memorandum from Dr. Mantel 1 (June 10, 1981) (Bates No. 500651585).
247. Id. at 2.
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field force it had assembled to distribute the TI’s message on the Garfinkel
study.  The packet contained orders for the field force to “personally visit more
than 200 news organizations nationwide” on Friday, June 12.248  About 100 video
news clips were sent to local television stations, and 400 audiocassettes were
sent to large radio stations.  Finally, the TI staff made personal visits to elected
and appointed officials.249
At this point, events took an unexpected turn.  A copy of the TI press
release found its way to Peter Lee, who realized the industry was about to make
a serious mistake.  Lee immediately sent a telex to Stuart Alexander of the
Tobacco Institute telling him that “Mantel’s suspicions that Hirayama has used
chi squared instead of chi are in my opinion definitely unfounded.”250  Lee fur-
ther cautioned that Mantel’s letter to Kastenbaum “only suggests there might
be [an error] and that more careful analysis is needed.”251  Lee had spoken with
Mantel, who communicated that he felt “it probable that the best analysis
methods would not significantly alter Hirayama’s conclusions.”252
Lee related that the data Dr. Kastenbaum had given Mantel were not “age-
standardized.”  Although Hirayama had not made this clear in his paper, the
data he used were, in fact, standardized for age and occupation.  Lee then pro-
vided a series of calculations using Hirayama’s age-standardized data that
yielded a chi (not chi-squared) value of 3.35, which was “very similar to quoted
3.299.”253  The difference was attributable to Hirayama’s having broken the table
down into five age groups in making his calculations but not having broken
down the data that far in his published tables.  In any event, it was “clear he did
not make any grave error.”254  Lee urged Alexander to persuade the TI not to
issue the press release.255  Otherwise, once someone demonstrated that Hira-
yama was right, the TI would “be in danger of implicitly agreeing passive
smoking causes lung cancer.”256
Lee’s telex created a serious dilemma for the TI.  It could have called halted
the public relations blitz pending a thorough investigation of Lee’s concerns.
Instead, it decided to do whatever it could to keep Mr. Lee quiet.  On the
248. Letter from Samuel D. Chilcote, Jr. to Ernest Pepples (June 11, 1981) (Bates No. TI1190-3139).
249. Tobacco Institute, Promotion of Hirayama and Garfinkel Stories, at tab A (June, 1981) (Bates
No. 03739559).
250. Telex from Peter Lee to Stuart Alexander (June 12, 1981) (Bates No. 517000679).
251. Id. at 1.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2.  Lee further noted that had Mantel or Kastenbaum “bothered to work out a chi value
corrected only for age in two groups” using Hirayama’s published data, they would have been inter-
ested to note that the chi rose from a non-significant 1.82 to a value of 2.71,” which was quite signifi-
cant.  Id.  Indeed “it would have risen further with finer age groups.”  Id.  Lee allowed that Mantel and
Kastenbaum “may not have known that Hirayama did not take into account time of death in the analy-
sis by considering every individual year of life” as Mantel had assumed.  In his experience, however,
“this would only have altered the value marginally tending usually to understate rather than over state
differences.”  Id.
255. Telex from Peter Lee to Stuart Alexander, supra note 250, at 2.
256. Id.
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morning of December 12, the day the blitz began, Horace Kornegay reported to
the TI Executive Committee that Kastenbaum had spoken with Lee on the
telephone, but could not evaluate Lee’s concerns because “Lee had not done
the calculations.”257  In fact, Lee had performed several detailed calculations and
had made them quite explicit in his telex.  As far as Kornegay was concerned,
however, “Lee’s criticism was without merit.”258
Kornegay further reported that Kastenbaum had just spoken with Dr.
Mantel who reported that Lee had called him to discuss the matter and had
suggested “that [t]he Tobacco Institute was ‘using’ him.”  Incensed, Kornegay
declared that “this unwarranted intervention” by Mr. Lee was “regarded by the
management of [t]he Institute as officious and without precedent.”259  Kornegay
therefore sent a cablegram to Sir James Wilson, the chairman of the TAC, to
inform him that the “highly officious actions on the part of your consultant, Mr.
Peter Lee, [were] deeply resented by the management of [t]he Tobacco Insti-
tute.”260  Kornegay related that he had instructed TI staff that “there shall be no
further advanced information supplied [to the TAC] until further notice.”261
Wilson replied that he was “deeply distressed that our good relations should
have been put in jeopardy in the way you describe,”262 and he promised to insti-
tute “a full inquiry at this end.”263  Kornegay “acknowledge[d] with thanks”
Wilson’s promise and explained why Dr. Kastenbaum believed Lee’s calcula-
tions (which he apparently now acknowledged) were erroneous.  In Wilson’s
absence, Hugh Grice of the TAC responded that he had asked Lee “to recon-
sider his calculations in the light of your message.”264
On another front, Ernest Pepples, general counsel of British American
Tobacco Company, called Richard Ely, a scientist at Brown & Williamson
Tobacco (“B&W”) on June 15 to complain about Lee.265  Pepples asked Ely “to
ensure that Peter Lee was carefully advised not to go direct[ly] to outsiders and
to consider very carefully any further statement that he himself would make in
order not to compromise his own reputation.”266  Ely noted that Hugh Grice of
the TAC had already “made arrangements to put these points across to Peter
Lee.”267  In the meantime, B&W would hold up distribution of the TI’s public
relations package.268
257. Memorandum from Horace R. Kornegay to Executive Committee (June 12, 1981) (Bates No.
03554397).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Cablegram from Horace R. Kornegay to Sir James Wilson (June 12, 1981) (Bates No. TI0427-
2875).
261. Id.
262. Cable from James Wilson to Horace R. Kornegay (June 15, 1981) (Bates No. 03029457).
263. Id.
264. Cable from Hugh Grice to Horace R. Kornegay (June 16, 1981) (Bates No. TI10150530).
265. Richard Ely, Note for File (June 17, 1981) (Bates No. 521024595).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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On June 17, Lee provided a detailed four-page response to the TI’s critique
of his earlier cable.269  After probing three possible theories under which the
data failed to demonstrate a statistically significant increase in lung cancer
among nonsmoking wives of smokers, Lee concluded once again that the chi
values in the published paper “seem just about right as far as I can see.”270
Another B&W statistician also examined the Hirayama data in light of Mantel’s
critique and related that his calculations “agree with Hirayama and Lee.”271
On June 26, Sir James Wilson wrote to Kornegay to provide the results of
the TAC’s internal investigation.272  Wilson was “deeply concerned, whatever
the merits of the statistical issue, lest any action by [the TAC] should have made
the task of T.I. more difficult.”273  On the other hand, Wilson was “completely
satisfied that Peter Lee had no intention of embarrassing the T.I. in any way.”274
Wilson conceded, however, that “in his anxiety to reach the truth” (a goal that
the TI was apparently not as anxious to attain), Lee had “somewhat exceeded
the proprieties.”  Wilson assured Kornegay that in the future, messages would
“be formally cleared through [the TAC] rather than referred directly to your
consultants.”275  However, Wilson by no means conceded that Lee was wrong on
the merits.  Indeed, after Lee subsequently presented his calculations to the
TAC Research Committee, its members unanimously “confirmed their confi-
dence in Mr. Lee’s interpretation of the statistics.”276
Soon thereafter, German tobacco-industry scientist Franz Adlkofer let it be
known that he agreed with Lee and believed that Mantel and Kastenbaum were
wrong.277  Adlkofer had met with Hirayama, and Hirayama had sent new data
confirming his conclusions.  Adlkofer invited Dr. Kastenbaum and Dr. Tsokos
to Germany to review the data,278 but TI chairman Horace Kornegay, “gave a
forceful veto” to that idea.279  Adlkofer later maintained that “Hirayama was
correct, that the TI knew it and . . . [the] TI published its statement about Hira-
yama knowing that the work was correct.”280
Lee’s allegations notwithstanding, the TI’s public relations blitz had its
intended effect.  As planned, stories began to appear over the weekend in major
newspapers across the country with titles like “Miscalculation Reported in
269. Letter from Peter N. Lee to D.G.I. Felton (June 17, 1981) (Bates No. 521024597).
270. Id. at 4.
271. Memorandum from A.I.B. to H.B.W. (June 18, 1981) (Bates No. 521024587).
272. Letter from James Wilson to Horace R. Kornegay (June 26, 1981) (Bates No. TIBR0016428).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the Research Committee of T.A.C. Held at 11:00 a.m. on Tues-
day, 21st July 1981 at Glen House, Stag Place, London, SWIE 5AG (July 21, 1981) (Bates No.
1000089356).
277. Memorandum from J.K. Wells, III to E. Pepples, Smoking and Health—Tim Finnegan 2 (July
24, 1981) (Bates No. 521028146).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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Study On Cancer in Wives of Smokers,”281 “Math Mistake Claimed in Smoking-
Peril Study,”282 and “Tobacco Unit Raps Smoking Study.”283  Local newscasts
devoted brief segments to the news about the Mantel letter and the TI’s une-
quivocal statement that “an arithmetical error invalidates this study.”284  Some-
time later, in a more carefully researched article, the Medical World News inter-
viewed Dr. Mantel to determine whether the TI had accurately characterized
his opinion.285  Mantel suggested that Hirayama “either made a more refined
analysis, of which he’s giving us no details, or perhaps he made an arithmetic
error.”  When presented with the TI press release stating that his memo “invali-
date[d]” Hirayama’s study, Mantel demurred: “I didn’t say that—the Tobacco
Institute did.”286  Later, Mantel told Time that, while he had raised questions
about the study, he had not concluded that it was invalid, as suggested by the
TI.  He related that the TI had “put words in my mouth.”287
Dr. Sugimura was traveling when Kornegay’s letter arrived,288 and he there-
fore had no immediate response.  As it happened, he was in Washington, D.C.
when he read about the Mantel criticism in the New York Times.289  At a meet-
ing with the TI’s public relations director, Sugimura said that the vice-director
of his institute had discussed the Mantel critique with Hirayama, who was “very
much concerned.”290  Hirayama promised to investigate the matter and send the
results of that investigation to Kornegay.  Sugimura understood that scientists
should “be willing to admit a mistake, but also should challenge a critic if the
critic is wrong.”291  Sugimura confided that he “was skeptical of the conclusion of
the study, right from the start.”292
On June 19, 1981, the long-awaited publication of the Garfinkel paper in the
Journal of the National Cancer Institute provided the opportunity for the second
round of the TI’s program to discredit Hirayama’s paper.293  Garfinkel’s paper
examined trends for lung cancer in nonsmokers over a twelve-year period using
data from an ongoing prospective epidemiological study initiated by the Ameri-
can Cancer Society (“ACS”) in 1960.  Acknowledging the Hirayama and
281. Miscalculation Reported in Study on Cancer in Wives of Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1981, at
B7.
282. Math Mistake Claimed in Smoking-Peril Study, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 1981.
283. Tobacco Unit Raps Smoking Study, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1981.
284. Radio TV Reports, Inc., Broadcast Excerpt, WINS-New York, June 14, 1981 (Bates No.
TIMN0019450).
285. On Passive Smoking: Cancer Society and Tobacco Institute in Rare Unity, MED. WORLD NEWS,
July 6, 1981, at 30.
286. Id.
287. Tobacco Wars: Is Passive Smoking Harmful?, TIME, July 6, 1981, at 43.
288. Cable from Ms. Kimura to Horace Kornegay (June 12, 1981) (Bates No. TI1015-0550).
289. Memorandum from William Kloepfer to Wilson Wyatt et al. (June 17, 1981) (Bates No.
TI0427-2866).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Lawrence Garfinkel, Time Trends in Lung Cancer Mortality Among Nonsmokers and a Note on
Passive Smoking, 66 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1061 (1981).
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Trichopoulos results, Garfinkel undertook a “similar analysis of nonsmokers”
identified in the ACS study, despite his concern that classifying nonsmoking
women on the basis of the smoking habits of their husbands was not an accurate
measure of their exposure to ETS.294  His analysis showed that the ratio of
adjusted lung cancer deaths in women whose husbands smoked fewer than
twenty cigarettes per day to those women whose husbands never smoked was
1.37, but the ratio with respect to wives of husbands who smoked more than
twenty cigarettes per day was only 1.04.295  Neither of the differences was statis-
tically significant, and the trend was clearly in the wrong direction to support a
causation hypothesis.296
Although these results by no means demonstrated that environmental
tobacco smoke was incapable of causing cancer in nonsmokers, the facts that
the Garfinkel study was based on a larger data set than the Hirayama study and
that the data were assembled in the United States, suggested that the conclu-
sions of the Hirayama and Trichopoulos studies were of questionable relevance
to the health risks of ETS in the United States.297  Yet Trichopoulos agreed that
neither his study nor Hirayama’s provided definitive information on the health
effects of ETS.298
The Tobacco Institute issued its pre-arranged press release stating that the
industry was “convinced from the outset of the highly questionable nature of
the Japanese finding that smokers create a lung cancer risk in their nonsmoking
spouses.”299  The TI was therefore pleased “to learn of the new American Can-
cer Society study contradicting that finding.”300  This, coupled with the TI’s dis-
covery of the error in the Hirayama study “and the many scientific criticisms of
it which have been published in the British Medical Journal, fully support[ed]
our misgivings.”301  The TI regretted that the Hirayama study “led to so many
news stories, editorials and other demands for smoking prohibitions from those
who unfortunately accepted it at face value.”302
Like the Mantel critique, the Garfinkel story received a great deal of atten-
tion in the press.  A New York Times headline read: “Research Casts Doubt on
294. Id. at 1064.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1065.  Peter Lee reviewed the Garfinkel paper in April, prior to its publication.  P.N. Lee,
“Time Trends in Lung Cancer Mortality Among Nonsmokers and a Note on Passive Smoking,” Some
Comments on the Paper by L. Garfinkel to Appear in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute,
(Apr. 3, 1981) (Bates No. 2025016956).  Lee found no reason to believe that the Garfinkel data were
materially biased.  Id. at 3.  Lee found that “Garfinkel’s findings are not consistent with the estimated
doubling of risk in heavy smokers given by Hirayama.”  Id. at 5.  Thus, despite the consistent findings of
the Hirayama and Trichopoulos papers, “more evidence is needed for a number of reasons.”  Id. at 1.
297. Garfinkel, supra note 293, at 1966.
298. Tobacco Wars, supra note 287.
299. Tobacco Institute, For Release (June 19, 1981) (Bates No. TI1185-1418).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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Danger of Cancer To Wives of Smokers.”303  Most of the stories also made ref-
erence to the Mantel critique.304  In total, more than 684 newspaper and maga-
zine articles appeared during June and July on the Mantel critique, the Gar-
finkel study, or both.305  Tobacco-industry representatives appeared on seventy-
five news and talk shows to relate “the doubts raised about the Japanese
study.”306
To be absolutely certain its message did not escape the public’s attention,
the industry launched a major advertising campaign in which it placed two full-
page advertisements in twenty major newspapers during early August, 1981.307
The ads were titled “Here’s What’s Now Being Said about Tobacco Smoke in
the Air” and featured headlines from several newspapers on the Mantel letter
and the Garfinkel study.308  The text of the ads claimed that “several eminent
biostatisticians found an apparent statistical error in the Japanese calculations—
raising serious questions about the study.”309  The ad campaign, however, was
the last straw for Dr. Mantel.  He told the press that he had “been offended by
the way they represented what I have done.”310  Furthermore, in his view, Gar-
finkel’s results were “not inconsistent with [those of] Hirayama.”311
Meanwhile, the scientific debate continued to rage in the professional jour-
nals.  The British Medical Journal responded to Kornegay’s alarming letter to
Sugimura by offering to publish it and the Mantel correspondence as letters to
the editor.312  It published those letters and another criticism of Hirayama’s
study by Dr. Eleanor J. MacDonald, another long-time tobacco-industry con-
sultant, in the October 1981 issue.313  In the same issue, the journal published a
303. Research Casts Doubt on Danger of Cancer to Wives of Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1981, at
A1.
304. Id.
305. Public Relations Department, Tobacco Institute, The Hirayama Controversy: An Analysis of
Media Activity, June 15-July 31, 1981 (Bates No. TITX0027702).
306. Tobacco Institute, Public Relations Division 1981 Highlights (December 10, 1981) (Bates No.
TIMN0017335, TIMN0017341) [hereinafter 1981 Highlights].  Having been informed that the Garfinkel
paper would be published in the June issue of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, the Tobacco
Institute had already launched a “Garfinkel Paper/Letter-to-Editor Program” through its nationwide
Tobacco Action Network (“TAN”).  Memorandum from Jack Kelly to TAN Corporate Coordinators,
Garfinkel Paper/Letter-to-Editor Program (June 1, 1981) (Bates No. TIFL0062177). A memorandum
to the TAN Corporate Coordinators predicted that the Garfinkel study would indicate “that the Hira-
yama study . . . does not apply to American women.”  Id. at 1.  Since the study “spurred significant leg-
islative efforts to restrict smoking,” it was important “that public knowledge of the conflicting ACS
results be as widespread as possible.”  Id.  The Tobacco Institute hoped that TAN could accomplish this
through a massive nationwide campaign of letters to the editors of local newspapers.  Id.  The memo
suggested language that might be included in the editorials.  Id. at 2.
307. Tobacco Industry Ad Campaign Ignites Dispute, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1981, at 4.
308. Tobacco Institute, Here’s What’s Now Being Said about Tobacco Smoke in the Air (undated)
(Bates No. TINY0011832).
309. Id.
310. Tobacco Industry Ad Campaign Ignites Dispute, supra note 307.
311. Id.
312. Letter from Daphne Gloag to Horace R. Kornegay (June 15, 1981) (Bates No. TI0427-2865).
313. Horace J. Kornegay & Marvin A. Kastenbaum, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 914 (1981); Eleanor
J. MacDonald, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 915 (1981); Nathan Mantel, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 914
(1981); see Letter from Patrick M. Sirridge to Thomas F. Ahrensfeld, et al. (Oct. 7, 1981) (Bates No.
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critique of the Mantel letter by two MIT statisticians and Hirayama’s own
defense of his paper.314  Hirayama provided a table containing the age- and
occupation-specific data Kastenbaum had demanded, and he noted that his cal-
culations had been confirmed by the two MIT statisticians and by statisticians at
the National Cancer Institute.315  He believed Dr. MacDonald had simply “mis-
understood” the statistical method he had employed.316  Finally, Hirayama was
not surprised by the Garfinkel study’s conclusions.  He noted that the “discrep-
ancy could be partly due to different methodology”317 and partly due to the fact
that Garfinkel obtained a much lower response rate because he had relied on
volunteer surveyors.318
* * *
The publication of the Hirayama study generated a legitimate scientific
debate over the extent to which the reported data justified Hirayama’s conclu-
sions.  For example, Newsweek reported that Dr. Nicholas Wald of Oxford Uni-
versity “voiced surprise” at the findings because, by his calculations, a
nonsmoker’s indirect exposure from a one-pack-per-day smoker would be less
than a single cigarette per day.319  Similarly, Dr. Garfinkel, who was no friend of
the tobacco industry, concluded that, despite the Hirayama study, ETS “did not
appear to be an important problem in the overall picture.”320  The tone of the
initial scientific debate, however, was cautious and nuanced by comparison with
the industry’s highly orchestrated attempt to trash Hirayama’s work in both the
scientific literature and the lay media.
01336493) (carrying a recommendation from Shook Hardy to the Committee of Counsel that funding
for Dr. MacDonald be continued and attaching a copy of her letter to the British Medical Journal).
314. Jeffrey E. Harris & William H. DuMouchel, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 915 (1981); Takeshi
Hirayama, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 916 (1981).
315. Hirayama, supra note 314.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.  The scientific debate continued in the British Medical Journal, which published the Tsokos
critique and a brief critique by Peter Lee in its November issue.  Tsokos maintained that Hirayama had
still not adequately explained how he derived his chi value of 3.29, and he related that no one had been
able to come up with that exact number using published data.  Chris P. Tsokos, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED.
J. 1464 (1981).  Lee first noted that Mantel had not taken age and occupation into account in his criti-
cism of the Hirayama paper, but he also pointed out that Hirayama had apparently made a minor sta-
tistical error in his response to Mantel in the previous issue.  The very small dose of ETS that non-
smokers received led Lee to “seriously doubt whether the elevated lung cancer risk seen in non-
smoking wives of smokers, statistically significant as it may be, is really caused by the passive smoke
exposure.”  Peter N. Lee, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 1465, 1466 (1981).  Lee viewed it as “far more likely
that the explanation lies in some hitherto undiscovered confounding or biasing factor.”  Id.  Hirayama
agreed with Lee that his most recent table contained errors, and he corrected them in an accompanying
table.  They did not, however, “influence the substance” of his earlier letter.  As to the issue of dose,
Hirayama suggested that the “only way to answer such questions must be by carrying out in-depth
studies of the chronic toxicity of sidestream smoke and of health consequences resulting from pro-
longed exposure to passive smoking.”  T. Hirayama, Letter, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 1466 (1981).
319. Matt Clark & David Shapiro, Secondhand Smoke and Lung Cancer, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1981,
at 63.  The Tobacco Institute worked Dr. Wald’s skeptical observations into a brief “backgrounder”
that it sent out soon after the publication of the study for use in answering initial press inquiries.  Telex
from Robert H. Bockman to W. Campbell (Jan. 27, 1981) (Bates No. 2504013075).
320. Garfinkel, supra note 293, at 1066.
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The press release on the Mantel letter is a classic example of the rhetoric of
the corpuscular approach to scientific evidence.  The industry spun Dr. Mantel’s
rather tentative conclusion that Kastenbaum’s analysis raised questions about
the Hirayama study into a confirmation of the existence of a fundamental
mathematical error invalidating Hirayama’s conclusions.  The unconfirmed pos-
sibility of a mathematical error rendered Hirayama’s analysis scientifically
worthless and therefore entirely ignorable, despite the supporting evidence of
the Trichopoulos study.  Ignoring Peter Lee’s convincing demonstration that
Kastenbaum’s criticism was misplaced, the industry steadfastly maintained its
position on the Hirayama study in legislative and administrative settings for the
next two decades, even as additional published studies suggested an association
between passive smoking and lung cancer.  As each important study was
released, the industry hauled out the scientific blunderbuss and its effective
public relations apparatus and attempted to blow it away.
In the final analysis, the scenario Lee envisioned when he warned the TI not
to go forward with its public relations blitz did play out in the scientific litera-
ture.  Hirayama was able to demonstrate through a letter to the editor that he
had in fact used the chi test, and Mantel made it clear that he felt he had been
used by the Tobacco Institute, as Lee had suggested.  Yet the TI did not recant.
Instead, it steadfastly maintained for the next twenty years that the study had
been the subject of many “highly critical” letters to scientific journals and was
therefore “scientifically questionable.”321
The industry regarded its efforts to discredit the Hirayama paper as a huge
success322 and held them up as a model for future scientific debates.  A late-1981
Liggett & Meyers memorandum argued: “Our recent experience with the Hira-
yama Report demonstrate[s] the need for promptly critiquing research to
determine its validity in order to identify the appropriate response to negative
research, be it scientific or statistical in nature.”323  The industry’s goal was to
attack the scientific underpinnings of individual studies as they became avail-
able.  The studies were then to be rejected as “junk science” and, as such, irrele-
vant to the debate over the dangers of smoking.
Most of the original skeptics who were not industry consultants later
changed their views as more evidence became available.  Dr. Wald, for exam-
ple, later authored a report for a committee empanelled by the National
Research Council concluding that the studies demonstrated a “highly significant
association” between ETS and lung cancer that could not be explained by sys-
321. See, e.g., Scientific Affairs Division, Tobacco Institute, Public Smoking in Perspective 2 (Sept.
28, 1981) (Bates No. TNWL0039291) (observing that “many highly critical letters about the . . . study
appeared shortly after its publication”).
322. See 1981 Highlights, supra note 306; Memorandum from E.A. Horrigan to J. Tylee Wilson et
al., Tobacco Institute-Hirayama/Garfinkel Publicity (June 30, 1981) (Bates No. 503947352) (noting that
“the end result was one of the best executed programs to come out of the Institute in a long time and
the successful achievement of major newspaper, radio and TV publicity for ‘our side’”).
323. Memorandum from Liggett Meyers, Tobacco Institute Proposal—New Directions (undated)
(Bates No. 502484395) (emphasis added).
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tematic bias.324  The paid industry consultants never changed their minds and
continued to attack the studies as they came out.  When EPA prepared its risk
assessment, the industry recruited these same consultants to trash that docu-
ment, and they were happy to oblige.
B. EPA Prepares a Draft Risk Assessment
In the years immediately following the publication of the Hirayama, Tricho-
poulos, and Garfinkel studies, additional case-control studies on the adverse
health effects of exposure to ETS began to appear.  In 1986, Surgeon General
C. Everett Koop issued a report concluding that the cancer risks of smoking
could “extend to those who inhale tobacco smoke emitted into the air.”325
Noting that sidestream smoke was “qualitatively similar to the mainstream
smoke inhaled by the active smoker,” the report concluded that “nonsmokers
are exposed to levels of environmental tobacco smoke that would be expected
to generate a lung cancer risk.”326  Adopting a weight-of-the-evidence approach,
and drawing upon both the Hirayama and Garfinkel studies, the report
declared that “[t]he relative abundance of data reviewed . . . , their cohesive-
ness, and their biologic plausibility  allow a judgment that involuntary smoking
can cause lung cancer in nonsmokers.”327
During the same year, the Committee on Passive Smoking appointed by the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) pub-
lished a report based upon a comprehensive review of the scientific literature.328
Although noting that the “physiochemical nature” of ETS differed from that of
mainstream smoke, the Committee pointed out that ETS contained many of the
same toxic chemicals as mainstream smoke.329  A causal connection between
ETS and disease was therefore “biologically plausible.”330  For the Committee,
“[t]he weight of evidence derived from epidemiologic studies,” including both
the Hirayama and Garfinkel cohort studies and several case-control studies,
demonstrated an association between ETS exposure and lung cancer that was
“unlikely to be due to chance or systematic bias.”331  The Committee therefore
324. Eliot Marshall, Tobacco Science Wars, 236 SCIENCE 250, 250 (1987).
325. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, ix (1986)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT].
326. Id. at x.
327. Id.  The report noted that the Hirayama study had “been critically discussed in correspondence
since its initial publication.”  Id. at 74.  In particular, Hirayama’s “failure to specifically describe the
methods for age standardization in the initial report led to speculation that the statistical methods used
were incorrect,” but “the calculations were later confirmed.”  Id. at 76
328. COMM. ON PASSIVE SMOKING, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE:
MEASURING EXPOSURES AND ASSESSING HEALTH EFFECTS (1986).
329. Id. at 7-8.
330. Id. at 11.
331. Id. at 245.
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concluded that “[c]onsidering the evidence as a whole, exposure to ETS
increases the incidence of lung cancer in nonsmokers.”332
In addition to activity on the scientific front, on October 17, 1986, Congress
enacted the Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality Research Act of 1986 (“the
Radon Act”).333  Pursuant to that statute,334 in 1988, EPA’s small indoor-air staff
asked the agency’s Office of Research and Development (“ORD”) to prepare a
risk assessment on ETS.335  The project proceeded slowly, in part because of the
lively debate it precipitated between ORD and the Air Program’s Criteria and
Assessment Office in the spring of 1990.336
Neither the Surgeon General’s nor the NAS report dissuaded the tobacco
industry from sustaining its attack on the Hirayama study.  The industry contin-
ued its references to the Mantel critique and the media reports about that
critique.337  The tobacco industry was also well aware of the significance of
EPA’s forthcoming ETS risk assessment.  A February 1990 briefing paper pre-
pared by RJR scientist Guy B. Oldaker warned that the ETS issue represented
“the single strongest attack” tobacco opponents had ever launched against the
industry.338  The threat, however, was based upon epidemiology, an inexact
science.  Since the opponents would never be able to prove as a purely scientific
matter that ETS caused lung cancer in nonsmokers, Oldaker predicted that the
“driving force will ultimately shift to the public domain,” which is occupied by
institutions such as EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (“OSHA”) that seek to “maintain their existence and . . . grow” by filling
power vacuums resulting from environmental disputes.339  The industry, Oldaker
argued, could respond in three ways to the ETS science problem: “We can
332. Id. at 8.
333. Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 401-405, 100 Stat. 1758.
334. Id. at § 403(c).  Enacted on October 17, 1986, the Radon Act required EPA to “establish a
research program with respect to radon gas and indoor air quality.”  Id. at § 403(a).  The program was
to include “research and development concerning the identification, characterization, and monitoring
of the sources and levels of indoor air pollution” and “research relating to the effects of indoor air
pollution and radon on human health.”  Id. at § 403(b)(1-2).  EPA was to assemble an interagency
committee of federal officials from agencies dealing with indoor air pollution and an advisory commit-
tee of individuals from the states, the scientific community, industry, and public interest organizations
to assist the agency in implementing the program.  Id. § 403(c).  However, the Act specifically declined
to authorize EPA to “carry out any regulatory program or any activity other than research, develop-
ment, . . . related reporting, [and] information dissemination.”  Id. at § 404.
335. Letter from William K. Reilly to Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (June 19, 1991) (Bates No. TI00951497).
336. See Memorandum from Chris DeRosa to William H. Farland, Review of “Lung Cancer Haz-
ards and Other Respiratory Effects Due to Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke,” (Apr. 27,
1990) (Bates No. 515705640) (concluding that the risk assessment was “most comprehensive, thorough
and well-written,” representing “a conscientious and detailed effort on a complex subject,” and “the
culmination of a solid analysis,” but suggesting various improvements in using risk assessment data on
mainstream smoke to assess ETS risks and in how the risk assessment addressed a major meta-analysis
of the ETS data).
337. See Tobacco Institute, Tobacco Smoke and the Nonsmoker: Scientific Integrity at the Cross-
roads 27-31 (Oct. 28, 1986) (Bates No. 2021002344).
338. Guy B. Oldaker, III, Briefing Paper on Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) 1 (Feb. 15, 1990)
(Bates No. 513000665).
339. Id. at 1, 3.
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ignore the issue. . . . We can mount a vigorous protest to the assaults on our
industry. . . . We can match the efforts of the opposition at every practical
opportunity and from all levels of our company and industry.”340  The industry
adopted the third approach.
On June 25, 1990, EPA made its draft risk assessment (“DRA”) available
for public review and comment.341  Relying heavily upon the analyses of the
scientific literature contained in the NAS and Surgeon General’s reports for its
analysis of the pre-1986 studies, the DRA provided a comprehensive analysis of
the literature published between 1986 and 1989 and integrated the results of all
of the studies into a single qualitative and quantitative whole.342
The DRA reached three important and controversial conclusions.  First,
ETS was a Group A human carcinogen.343  According to EPA’s carcinogen
assessment guidelines, this meant there was “sufficient evidence from epide-
miologic studies to support a causal association between exposure to [ETS] and
cancer.”344  Second, using a conservative quantitative risk-assessment model,
EPA estimated that exposure to ETS caused approximately 3,800 lung cancers
per year.345  Third, EPA concluded that exposure of infants and young children
to ETS from parental smoking was associated with increased prevalence of
acute lower respiratory tract infections (bronchitis and pneumonia), respiratory
symptoms of irritation (cough, sputum, wheeze), and middle-ear effusions (a
sign of chronic middle-ear disease), decreased lung function in childhood, and a
small reduction in the rate of pulmonary growth and development.346
At the heart of the DRA was a meta-analysis of the combined data from
nineteen case-control studies and the data from the three cohort studies:
the Hirayama study, the Trichopolous study, and the Garfinkel study.347  The
340. Id. at 4.
341. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer
in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children; External Review Draft, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,874 (June 25,
1990) [hereinafter EPA Risk Assessment].  Although it contains a May 1990 date, the draft risk assess-
ment was not released until June 25, 1990.  The primary author was EPA consultant Kenneth G.
Brown, who wrote all of the chapters of the DRA and Appendix B.  Id. at xiv.
342. Id. at x.
343. Id. at 1-3.
344. 1986 Final Guidelines, supra note 9, at 34,000.  EPA concluded that if ETS did not cause cancer
in nonsmoking wives, then four of the nineteen existing case-control studies were false positives, and
the probability of that happening was 0.013.  The analysis further concluded that more than half of the
nineteen studies had p-values of 0.1 or less, an outcome that would occur with the probability of less
than 0.001 if cancer incidence in nonsmoking wives of smokers was unrelated to ETS exposure.  EPA
Risk Assessment, supra note 341, at 3-21.  Moreover, the trends in the fourteen studies that allowed for
dose-response supported the conclusion that “the observed association between exposure to ETS and
increased occurrence of lung cancer deaths [was] statistically significant.”  Id. at 3-25.
345. EPA Risk Assessment, supra note 341, at 1-5.
346. Id. at 1-5 to 1-9.
347. Id. at 4-24.  The DRA noted that the Hirayama study had received much critical scrutiny over
the years, but Hirayama had “adequately addressed [the criticisms] as described in the [Surgeon Gen-
eral] and [NAS] reports.”  Id. at 3-34.  The DRA also cited the published results of a roundtable discus-
sion at a 1984 symposium for the proposition that “previous challenges to Hirayama’s work regarding
data analysis and other issues appear to have been resolved, aside perhaps from the issue of mis-
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result was an overall relative risk of 1.41, somewhat larger than the relative risk
of 1.32 for females reported in the NAS study.  Since the EPA meta-analysis
included more data, its confidence interval was somewhat smaller, a reflection
of the reduced statistical uncertainty.348  The 1.42 relative risk for the case-con-
trol studies was almost identical to the 1.39 relative risk for the cohort studies,
so EPA concluded that “the results of one type of study reinforced the outcome
from the other type.”349
The authors of the DRA understood that the studies probably reflected
some misclassification bias.  They applied a complicated formula to account for
this bias, which reduced the relative risk for the meta-analysis to 1.28.350  The
numbers had to be adjusted upward again, however, to reflect nonsmoking
women’s exposure to background levels of ETS outside of the home.351  This
resulted in a relative risk of 1.48 for the combined case-control and cohort
data,352 a figure in the same range as the 1.34 relative risk reported in the NAS
study, which had used eight fewer case-control studies.
Finally, the conclusion that ETS was a Group A carcinogen was biologically
plausible.  The DRA cited numerous scientific studies demonstrating that the
sidestream smoke (“SS”) emitted from a smoldering cigarette between puffs—
the main component of ETS—contained many of the same carcinogenic com-
pounds scientists had identified in mainstream smoke (“MS”).353  EPA under-
stood that nonsmoker exposure to these carcinogens varies because the compo-
sition of chemicals in ETS and their relative distribution between vapor and
particulate phases change over time.354  Moreover, passive exposure to the
chemical constituents of ETS occurs at much lower concentrations than active
exposure to the same constituents in MS.355  Nevertheless, since any level of
exposure to a carcinogen carries a potential cancer risk, the excess risk reported
in many of the epidemiologic studies made sense biologically.356
C. Review by EPA’s Science Advisory Board
Tobacco industry scientists and dozens of consultants spent the summer and
early fall of 1990 preparing more than twenty-five densely detailed critiques of
reported smoking habits.”  Id. (citing G. Lehnert, Roundtable Discussion from Symposium “Medical
Perspectives on Passive Smoking,” 13 PREVENTIVE. MED. 732, 732-33 (1984)).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. EPA Risk Assessment, supra note 341, at 4-25.  The formula used to reduce the relative risk
was explained in a detailed appendix.
351. Id. at 4-28.  The DRA noted that after the NAS panel adjusted its estimate of the increased risk
associated with spousal smoking from thirty-four to twenty-five percent to reflect misclassification bias,
it made a second adjustment to take background exposures into account, and this raised the increased
risk back up to forty-two percent.  Id. at 3-32.
352. Id. at 4-24.
353. Id. at 1-2.
354. Id. at 2-1.
355. EPA Risk Assessment, supra note 341, at 1-2, 2-1.
356. Id. at 1-2.
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the DRA.  The critiques were submitted to the agency’s Science Advisory
Board (“SAB”), which agreed to review the document for scientific accuracy.357
Philip Morris, RJR, and the TI coordinated their responses so that at least one
submission touched upon every conceivable aspect of the DRA, and so that
every submission forcefully made the same important general points.358
On October 1, 1990, the industry submitted massive filings containing thou-
sands of pages of comments and criticisms.359  The TI’s cover letter suggested
that the entire EPA effort was a waste of time and resources because the exist-
ing studies provided “no basis on which to conduct a risk assessment.”360  Philip
Morris maintained that the DRA’s classification of ETS as a Group A carcino-
gen was “based solely on uncritical acceptance of several human epidemiologi-
cal studies” that had been heavily criticized in the scientific literature.361  Finding
EPA’s risk assessment “analogous to a lawyer’s brief,” RJR argued that EPA’s
“[p]olicy preferences should not be foisted upon the lay public disguised as
science.”362
The bulkiest submission was a 220-page letter by Gary Huber purporting to
discuss every published study on ETS and human disease, including “several
357. Tobacco Institute, Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report, Public Smoking Issue 1
(Aug. 1990) (Bates No. TIDN0017470) [hereinafter August Management Report].  The TI’s Public
Smoking PR staff continued to work on “approximately 25 scientific reviews to be submitted to EPA at
the close of its comment period and to the SAB in advance of the Board’s hearing on the risk assess-
ment and policy guide.”  The SAB is a formal EPA advisory committee composed of distinguished sci-
entists, engineers, and economists from around the country.  Congress created EPA’s SAB in the Envi-
ronmental Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2000).
According to the statute, the SAB was to be composed of at least nine independent members who
would provide scientific advice to the administrator.  The SAB was to review proposed criteria docu-
ments and provide advice and comments to the administrator regarding the scientific and technical
basis of proposed criteria, standards, limitations or regulations.  EPA has traditionally limited the SAB
to about sixty permanent members who serve for staggered terms of one to four years.  More than 250
additional scientists and engineers serve as consultants to the SAB on various issues where additional
expertise is deemed desirable.  The SAB has a staff of about twenty EPA employees.
358. Id. (stating that the TI staff “continued coordinating the industry’s submissions on both draft
documents with member companies who planned to submit independent comments.”); Tobacco Insti-
tute, Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report, Public Smoking Issue 1 (July 1990) (Bates No.
TIDN0017433) (“We continued coordinating the industry’s submissions on both draft documents with
two member companies who planned to submit independent comments.”).  This was not inexpensive.
For the month of July, TI’s legal expenses for the public smoking issue came to more than $308,000.
During the same month, TI spent more than $1,300,000 on professional fees for the “concerted activity
of scientists on ETS research and the EPA risk assessment.”  August Management Report, supra note
357, at 7.
359. Philip Morris, Inc., EPA Review Draft: Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of
Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children, Comments of Philip Morris, Inc. (Sept.
28, 1990) (Bates No. 2028557177) [hereinafter Philip Morris Comments]; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Comments of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company on Health Effects of Passive Smoking—Assessment of
Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children (Oct. 1, 1990) (Bates No. 508142133)
[hereinafter RJR Comments]; Tobacco Institute, Comments of the Tobacco Institute on Health Effects
of Passive Smoking—Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children
(Oct. 1, 1990) (Bates No. 87698139) [hereinafter TI Comments].
360. Letter from Samuel D. Chilcote, Jr. to the Project Officer for Environmental Tobacco Smoke
(Oct. 1, 1990) (Bates No. 503246519).
361. Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 1-2.
362. Id. at 81.
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thousand more articles than were cited in the EPA review draft.”363  The prod-
uct of an entire year of analysis at the tobacco industry’s expense, Huber’s criti-
cism that literature cited in the DRA was “selective and . . . not complete”364 had
an authoritative ring.  Since EPA staff declined to provide a detailed descrip-
tion of every published study of any conceivable relevance to the association
between ETS and lung cancer, instead relying on the work already done in sup-
port of previous reports by a committee of the National Research Council and
the Surgeon General, Huber could plausibly claim that the DRA would have
reached a substantially different conclusion if only its scientists had matched his
efforts.
Apparently willing to be used again by the TI, Nathan Mantel wrote a fifty-
two-page critique of the DRA that was very critical Hirayama’s most recent
report.  Dr. Mantel believed Hirayama had not satisfactorily answered a 1983
guest editorial in which Mantel had pointed out “the highly defective nature of
the Hirayama study and analysis, including its failure to take into account prop-
erly the cohort nature of the study.”365  Mantel asserted that the high relative
risk in the Hirayama study “could well reflect a greater misclassification bias,
with married women denying that they were in fact smokers, i.e., giving the
seemingly correct answer rather than the factual answer.”366  The frequently
repetitious submissions of several other industry consultants also criticized the
Hirayama study.367  Even Peter Lee had something negative to say about its
exposure index’s reliance upon whether the spouse currently smoked, rather
than the more appropriate index of whether the spouse ever smoked.368
The tobacco industry and its consultants had a number of criticisms of
EPA’s meta-analysis techniques and the ETS data it had selected the analysis.
First, they maintained that EPA improperly applied recognized meta-analysis
techniques.369  Dr. Mantel warned that if several of the individual studies
363. Letter from Gary Huber to the Project Officer for Environmental Tobacco Smoke 1 (Sept. 28,
1990) (Bates No. 525012050).
364. Id. at 1.
365. Nathan Mantel, Commentary 10 (Sept. 18, 1990) (Bates No. 2023475261).
366. Id. at 10-11.
367. See Earl Jonas, Comments on the EPA Review Draft: “Health Effects of Passive Smoking:
Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children” 5 (Sept. 28, 1990) (Bates
No. 87655618); S. James Kilpatrick, Comments on Dr. Hirayama’s Record Linkage Study of Japanese
Adults in “Epidemiological Evidence of Lung Cancer From ETS” 10 (Sept. 24, 1990) (Bates No.
87662455); Maurice E. LeVois & Maxwell W. Layard, Summary of Major Criticisms of EPA’s Draft
Risk Assessment: Health Effects of Passive Smoking 11 (Sept. 25, 1990) (Bates No. 87656106); Karl
Uberla, Comments on the Draft Document—Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung
Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children and Environmental Tobacco Smoke: A Guide
to Workplace Smoking Policies 3-11 (Sept. 21, 1990) (Bates No. 87666437); Lawrence M. Wexler,
Comments on the EPA Draft Document Entitled “Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of
Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children” 11 (Sept. 26, 1990) (Bates No.
2046090141).
368. P.N. Lee, “Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Res-
piratory Disease in Children”: A Commentary on Issues Relating to Lung Cancer in the May 1990 EPA
External Review Draft 10 (Sept. 19, 1990) (Bates No. 507971697).
369. RJR Comments, supra note 359, at 12-13.
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contained similar biases, then meta-analysis could allow those biases “to rein-
force each other.”370  Thus, even though the bias in any single study might be too
small to be statistically significant, the biases could combine in a meta-analysis
“to give rise to an overall appearance of statistical significance” that was scien-
tifically unjustified.371
Second, the industry argued that EPA improperly included and excluded
data from individual studies.  EPA should have limited the meta-analysis to
studies undertaken in the United States, thus eliminating the Hirayama study
from the meta-analysis.372  At the same time, it should have included a study
published in a dissertation that found no link between ETS and cancer.373  The
drafters of the report had considered the dissertation, but failed to include the
data in the meta-analysis because the author had died, and his advisor could not
be reached to verify the otherwise unpublished data.374
Third, the industry’s scientists criticized the meta-analysis for combining
data from studies that were not sufficiently similar to yield accurate compari-
sons.375  For example, the industry argued that combining case-control and
cohort studies was inappropriate because different durations of observation
could introduce bias into the combined analysis.376  The demand for compara-
370. Mantel, supra note 365, at 13; see also LeVois & Layard, supra note 367, at 8 (“Since the possi-
ble effects of bias in confounding are not adequately controlled in the individual studies, pooling the
studies in a meta-analysis greatly increases the probability that the systematic effects of these errors will
be significant and introduces the additional possibility that publication bias has restricted attention
mainly to positive results.”).
371. Mantel, supra note 365, at 13.
372. Letter from W.H. Butler to the Project Officer for Environmental Tobacco Smoke 3 (Sept. 26,
1990) (Bates No. 2023474857); LeVois & Layard, supra note 367, at 8; National Chamber Federation,
ETS Comments 1 (Aug. 15, 1990) (Bates No. TIMN 343325) [hereinafter NCF Comments]; Letter from
Petr Skrabenek to the Project Officer for ETS 1 (Sept. 18, 1990) (Bates No. 2023475720); A. Springall,
Submission of Comments on the Draft EPA Report: Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of
Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children 5 (Sept. 1990) (Bates No. 507972473);
Memorandum from Paul Switzer to the Project Officer for Environmental Tobacco Smoke, Comments
on the EPA Review Draft Health Effects of Passive Smoking 5 (Sept. 27, 1990) (Bates No. 503246500);
R.L. Tweedie & K.L. Mengersen, Lung Cancer and Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke:
Appendix 1: Review of Individual Studies 10 (1990) (Bates No. 507758436).
373. Luis R. Varela, Assessment of the Association Between Passive Smoking and Lung Cancer
(May 1987) (Bates No. 2023382403); see Butler, supra note 372, at 3; Lee, supra note 368, at 9; NCF
Comments, supra note 372, at 1; Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 58; RJR Comments, supra
note 359, at 23-24; Springall, supra note 372, at 4; Uberla, supra note 367, at 3; Wexler, supra note 372,
at 6.
374. Philip Morris undertook a large public relations campaign criticizing EPA for missing the
study.  See Richard Kluger, ASHES TO ASHES (1996).  Janerich later published a complete analysis of
his data that concluded that a statistically significant association did exist.  See Dwight T. Janerich et al.,
Lung Cancer and Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Household, 143 NEW ENG. J. MED. 632 (1990).
375. Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 2; see also Letter from J.W. Daniel to Project Offi-
cer for Environmental Tobacco Smoke 2 (Sept. 14, 1990) (Bates No. 87655009) (arguing that the EPA
meta-analysis was “unreliable because the individual ETS studies vary significantly in study design,
methodology, sample population, confounding risk factors, etc.”); Wexler, supra note 367, at 5 (arguing
that “the extreme differences in data collection, methodology, and measure of ETS exposure among
the 21 studies make any test for statistical homogeneity meaningless”).
376. RJR Comments, supra note 359, at 15; see also E. Lee Husting, An Epidemiological Review of
the EPA Report: Health Effects of Passive Smoking, Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respi-
ratory Disorders in Children 13 (Sept., 1990) (Bates No. 87663772) (arguing that studies with different
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bility was easy for the industry to make—and difficult for EPA to satisfy—
because there are few fully agreed-upon epidemiological protocols.  If the
industry was demanding that all epidemiological studies make all observations
and adjust for all confounding factors in identical ways, then no meta-analysis
would ever be possible.  The question was essentially whether EPA should have
undertaken a meta-analysis at all.
Fourth, the industry was not happy with the way EPA adjusted its relative
risk calculations upward to reflect background exposures to ETS that non-
smoking wives receive outside the home because that adjustment was appropri-
ate only if ETS exposure in fact causes lung cancer.377  The industry argued that
this constituted circular reasoning: EPA was assuming that ETS caused lung
cancer as part of its attempt to determine whether ETS caused lung cancer.
However, given that several studies independently demonstrated a positive
association between ETS exposure and lung cancer, it was not necessarily cir-
cular for EPA to assume the association existed for purposes of cumulating data
from many studies, several of which alone lacked the statistical power to sup-
port relative risk determinations at low relative risk ratios.
Finally, the industry was especially critical of EPA’s willingness to draw
cause-effect conclusions from a meta-analysis that demonstrated, at best, only a
very weak statistical association between ETS exposures and lung cancer in
humans.378  Although EPA’s guidelines specified no quantitative threshold for
strength of association, the industry commenters argued that relative risks of 2.0
to 5.0 were required.379  The strength of association necessary to support a statis-
tically significant conclusion that a causal relationship exists is ultimately a
policy question dependent upon the epidemiologist’s willingness to be wrong.
It is not surprising that the industry was more risk averse in this regard than
EPA.  The DRA, however, left it to the reader to decide whether the statistical
association was sufficiently powerful to justify conclusions about carcinogenic
risks posed by ETS.
durations of observation may not be combined in a meta-analysis or serious bias might result because,
for example, air pollution levels could have changed over the years).
377. RJR Comments, supra note 359, at 32; see also Mantel, supra note 365, at 7 (arguing that back-
ground adjustment “presupposes that there is indeed a passive smoking effect”).
378. Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 1 (“[T]he notion of strength of association [was]
not applied to the epidemiologic studies on ETS.”); Tweedie & Mengersen, supra note 372, at 8 (citing
EPA guidelines for proposition that strength-of-association is one of the standard criteria for evaluating
an epidemiological study).
379. Daniel, supra note 375, at 2 (stating that a relative risk value of less than 3.0 is “generally con-
sidered to represent an extremely weak association”); Husting, supra note 376, at 17 (arguing that an
association of less than 3.0 relative risk is weak); Mantel, supra note 365, at 3 (stating that “relative
risks should exceed 1.50 to be taken seriously”); Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 8 (“[A]n
association is generally considered weak if the odds ratio is under 3.0 and particularly when it is under
2.0.”); RJR Comments, supra note 359, at 49–50 (noting that EPA’s staff at a September 1989 work-
shop on EPA’s guidelines suggested that a relative risk below 5.0 might be considered weak); Tweedie
& Mengersen, supra note 372, at 8 (arguing that a relative risk of greater than 3.0 required); Wexler,
supra note 367, at 7 (“[R]elative risks of less than 2.0 are generally considered to be weak.”).
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The industry and its contractors were also unimpressed by EPA’s biological
plausibility conclusion.380  They argued that ETS was a poorly characterized and
dynamic mixture of thousands of compounds that differed both qualitatively
and quantitatively from both mainstream smoke and sidestream smoke.381  Many
factors affected the composition of ETS, including dilution, room volume, ven-
tilation, temperature, humidity, lighting, and absorption by surfaces.382  The dis-
tribution between the particulate and vapor phases of mainstream smoke dif-
fered substantially from the distribution in ETS.383  Indeed, that the cancers in
smokers caused by mainstream smoke (squamous-cell and small-cell carcino-
mas) were by and large not the same as the cancers allegedly caused in non-
smoking wives by ETS (adenocarcinomas) appeared to undercut any argument
based upon biological plausibility.384
The industry argued that dosimetric considerations also augered against a
finding that ETS exposure caused lung cancer.  The concentrations of potential
carcinogens in ETS were orders of magnitude smaller than those measured in
mainstream smoke.385  The very modest exposures to any carcinogenic constitu-
380. Edward L. Alpen, A Critique of EPA External Review Draft 600/6-90/006A, May 1990,
“Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders
in Children” 5 (Feb. 1991) (Bates No. 2026125439) (stating that the DRA’s biological plausibility
approach “cannot stand close scientific scrutiny”); Butler, supra note 372, at 4 (arguing that the
assumption that ETS has roughly the same constituents as mainstream smoke is “probably incorrect”);
Lee, supra note 368, at 17 (arguing that the DRA failed to discuss properly “the plausibility of the asso-
ciation seen between spousal smoking and lung cancer”); Mantel, supra note 365, at 2 (rejecting the
reasoning that “if cigarette smoking can cause lung cancer, then passive smoking is also likely to cause
lung cancer”).
381. Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 13-14; see also Statement of John Wesley Clayton,
Jr. 8 (undated) (Bates No. 503244740) (pointing to “profound qualitative and quantitative differences
among (1) mainstream smoke, (2) side-stream smoke, and (3) ETS”); Husting, supra note 376, at 45-46
(citing numerous references for the proposition that ETS is a complex mixture that is not identical to
mainstream smoke); Mark J. Reasor & James A. Will, Evaluation of the EPA Draft Report Health
Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer and Respiratory Disorders in Children 4 (Sept.
1990) (Bates No. 2026188180) (arguing that “ETS is insufficiently characterized relative to mainstream
smoke, that the exposure conditions involving the two materials differ significantly, and that extrapola-
tion from mainstream smoke exposure to ETS exposure accordingly are problematic”); RJR Com-
ments, supra note 359, at 60; Skrabanek, supra note 372, at 1-2 (rejecting the concept of “incriminating
a complex mixture of substances, whose chemical and physical properties are poorly understood with-
out reference to concentrations and exposure times”); John A. Todhunter, Review of the Draft EPA
Document Entitled “Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and
Respiratory Disorders in Children” 38 (Sept. 1990) (Bates No. 503246583) (noting that mainstream
smoke and ETS are very different in composition and behavior).
382. Reasor & Will, supra note 381, at 6.
383. Alan Rodgman, A Comparison of the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Properties of Ciga-
rette Mainstream Smoke (MS), Cigarette Sidestream Smoke (SS), and Environmental Tobacco Smoke
(ETS) (1991) (Bates No. 2026125296).  For example, nicotine in the more acidic MS occurred almost
exclusively in the particulate phase, whereas nicotine in ETS occurred almost exclusively in the vapor
phase.  Id.  This difference in phases might or might not affect toxicity.
384. Letter from F. Adlkofer to Project Officer for ETS Policy Guide 2-3 (Sept. 26, 1990) (Bates No.
503244675); Butler, supra note 372, at 3-4; Guy Crepat, A Commentary on Issues Relating To Lung
Cancer in the 1990 EPA External Review Draft 3 (Sept. 25, 1990) (Bates No. 2026127628); Letter from
D. Schmahl to the Project Officer for ETS Policy Guide 1 (July 25, 1990) (Bates No. 508136421); Skra-
banek, supra note 372, at 1.
385. Philip Morris Comments, supra note 359, at 13-14; see also Daniel, supra note 375, at 2 (noting
that “exposure of non-smokers to ETS is two or more orders of magnitude less than the exposure of
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ents encountered by nonsmokers in ETS were, in the industry’s view, well
below the thresholds necessary to invoke a carcinogenic response.386  In addition
to challenging the standard nonthreshold model of chemical carcinogenesis, the
industry even challenged EPA’s base assumption that “smoking is a causative
factor for lung cancer in humans.”387
Although ETS probably contained as many compounds as mainstream
smoke, no one knew what they were.  Thus, the industry could plausibly argue
that chemical similarity could not support the drawing of conclusions about the
carcinogenicity of ETS from existing studies on mainstream smoke.  The argu-
ment that there is a threshold exposure level to most carcinogens, below which
as a practical matter the carcinogen will cause no tumors, was a familiar one to
regulatory agencies, and the industry added nothing new to the debate in that
regard.  Although it is certainly possible that thresholds do exist for some car-
cinogens, no federal regulatory agency has been willing to assume this is the
case, and the tobacco industry by no means demonstrated that thresholds
existed for the carcinogenic compounds identified by EPA and the NAS in
environmental tobacco smoke.
At the end of a two-day meeting in December 1990, at which most of the
tobacco industry’s criticisms were aired, the SAB committee sent the DRA
active smokers to mainstream smoke”); Huber, supra note 363, at 2 (arguing that ETS constituents are
“highly diluted by a factor of 100 to 1000 or more relative to mainstream tobacco smoke”); Husting
Comments, supra note 376, at 45 (noting “serious questions about the dosages of ETS received by a
non-smoker and smoker”); LeVois & Layard, supra note 367, at 10 (arguing that a cigarette equivalent
risk two or three orders of magnitude lower than EPA’s estimate based upon epidemiological data
alone “challenge[d] the biological plausibility of the effect observed in the ETS epidemiologic stud-
ies”); Rodgman, supra note 383, at iv (positing “MS/ETS dilution ratios” for nicotine (ranging from
57,000 to 7,200,000), acrolein (1500 to 2800), acetone (240 to 2000), benzene (112 to 7000) and
benzo(a)pyrene (68 to 40,000)); Springall, supra note 372, at 5 (noting that dosimetry-based estimates
of lung cancer deaths were an order of magnitude lower than EPA’s estimates based on the epidemio-
logy studies); Theodor D. Sterling et. al., Evaluation of a Report by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency on: Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory
Disorders in Children 2-3 (Sept. 20, 1990) (Bates No. 2026133314) (arguing that the “number of lung
cancers associated with ETS by the use of the cigarette-equivalent model is less by more than an order
of magnitude than the number of lung cancers that can be ascribed to ETS using the epidemiologic
model”).
386. Daniel, supra note 375, at 2-3 (arguing that the assumption that there is no safe level for car-
cinogens is controversial); Jonas, supra note 367, at 2 (arguing that EPA’s assumption that any level of
exposure to a carcinogen carried a potential risk of cancer was “far from proven” and was “contra-
dicted by a considerable body of evidence”); Comments by George B. Leslie, FRC Path., on May 1990
EPA External Review Draft: “Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer in
Adults and Respiratory Disease in Children” 1-2 (1990) (Bates No. 2026133012) (arguing that EPA’s
view was “contrary to the view of many toxicologists, and is also contrary to common human experi-
ence”); Rodgman, supra note 383, at iii (arguing that “a practical threshold limit value does exist for
known tumorigens” and that “[t]his has been demonstrated not only for MS . . . but also for several of
the MS components on [EPA’s] list of 43”); Skrabanek, supra note 372, at 1-2 (rejecting presumption
that ETS constituents lack thresholds); Todhunter, supra note 381, at 15 (“[D]ata in the observed range
are as consistent with there being no effect at very low exposures as there are with there being an
effect.”).
387. RJR Comments, supra note 359, at 58.  Rodgman, supra note 383, at iv (arguing that tumor-
inhibiting agents in MS and ETS offset tumorigenic compounds).
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back to EPA for further work.388  The committee concurred with EPA’s ultimate
conclusion that ETS was a Class A carcinogen,”389 but it advised the agency to
place greater weight on the “biological considerations and the extensive experi-
ence with active smoking to support the classification.”390  The committee
agreed that spousal smoking was an appropriate indicator of ETS exposure and
that epidemiological studies from other countries were relevant to the analy-
sis.391  Furthermore, meta-analysis was “an appropriate tool to summarize the
epidemiological studies,” and EPA had adequately accounted for confounding
factors in its meta-analysis.392  However, the DRA had over-emphasized the
meta-analysis and shortchanged the biological considerations related to respira-
tory carcinogenesis that provided “compelling evidence that it is consistent with
the results of the meta-analysis.”393  Since the document was “incomplete in
many respects,” the committee recommended organizational changes and
offered suggestions for buttressing its technical content.394
Seventeen months later, EPA circulated for comment a much more com-
prehensive risk assessment in advance of a second SAB meeting on July 21 and
22, 1992.  The tobacco industry once again submitted hundreds of pages of criti-
cisms of the new draft.  This time, the SAB committee concluded that the
revised draft had an “improved presentation, discussion, and analysis of ETS as
a lung carcinogen, providing a firmer basis for the designation of ETS as an
EPA Class A Carcinogen,” a classification it unanimously endorsed.395  The
committee was confident the risk assessment would be “an invaluable source of
information for health professionals and policymakers for years to come.”396
Having received the SAB’s endorsement, EPA published its final risk
assessment (“FRA”) in December 1992.397  Once again it concluded that ETS
was a human carcinogen, and this time it estimated that ETS was “responsible
for approximately 3,000 lung cancer deaths annually in U.S. nonsmokers.”398
The FRA relied upon the biological plausibility of the conclusion that ETS
caused lung cancer, given “the established causal relationship between lung
388. Letter from Raymond Loehr & Morton Lippman to William K. Reilly (Apr. 19, 1991) (Bates
No. 2026096384); see also Indoor Air Quality and Total Human Exposure Comm., Envtl. Protection
Agency, Environmental Tobacco Smoke Review, at 165 (Dec. 5, 1990) (Bates No. 87209741).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 2-3.
392. Id. at 3-4.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Letter from Raymond C. Loehr & Morton Lippmann to William K. Reilly 2 (Nov. 20, 1992)
(Bates No. 515926835).
396. Id.
397. Office of Atmospheric and Indoor Air Programs, Envtl. Protection Agency, Respiratory
Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders, EPA/600/6-90/006F (Dec. 1,
1992), available at http://oaspub.epa.gov/eims/eimsapi.dispdetail?deid=2835 (last visited Apr. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter FINAL RISK ASSESSMENT].
398. Id. at 1-1.
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cancer and active smoking.”399  Since several new epidemiological studies,
including the Janerich study, had become available in the interim, the FRA now
incorporated thirty studies rather than twenty-two.400  Nine of the thirty individ-
ual case-control and cohort studies demonstrated an association between lung
cancer and spousal ETS exposure at the 90% confidence level; the probability
of this happening by chance was less than one in ten thousand.401  Reacting to
tobacco-industry criticism, EPA elected not to undertake an overall meta-
analysis of all the epidemiological studies.  Instead, it performed smaller meta-
analyses of groups of studies arranged by country and exposure level.402  The
FRA found increased risks for the highest exposure groups without exception,
and the relative risk estimates “pooled within countries [were] all statistically
significant and range[d] from 1.38 to 3.11.”403
D. The Court’s Opinion
Six months after EPA issued the final risk assessment, the Flue-Cured
Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation and several tobacco companies
sued the agency in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina.404  They alleged that EPA violated the Radon Act,405 the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,406 and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.407
The group sought a declaratory judgment that EPA’s classification of ETS as a
human carcinogen was arbitrary and capricious, and prayed for a permanent
injunction requiring EPA to withdraw its risk assessment.408  The group claimed
that the publication of the risk assessment caused harm to the tobacco industry
because it damaged the reputation of its products and because it would pre-
dictably result in additional attempts to regulate smoking in public places.409
The district court first addressed the industry’s contention that EPA vio-
lated the Radon Act both substantively and procedurally.410  The parties agreed
that the meaning of the Statute was plain, so the dispute could be resolved
without resorting to step two of the prescribed Chevron analysis,411 but they dis-
399. Id. at 1-7.
400. Id. at 1-6.
401. Id.
402. FINAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 397, at ch. 5.
403. Id. at 5-62.
404. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, No. 6:93CV00370, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7521 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 1995).
405. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 nt. (2000).
406. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
407. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
408. Flue-Cured Tobacco, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7521, at *9-10.
409. Id. at *12.
410. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439-40 (M.D.N.C.
1998), vacated and remanded by 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
411. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the
Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for judicial review of agency interpretations of the statutes
that they administer:
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agreed on the Statute’s plain meaning.  The court rejected the industry’s sub-
stantive argument that the Radon Act does not authorize EPA to prepare an
ETS risk assessment.  In the court’s view, the Statute’s requirement that EPA
conduct research on the adverse health effects of indoor air pollutants and dis-
seminate those findings plainly empowered EPA to prepare a formal risk
assessment of ETS and to classify ETS according to its pre-existing carcinogen
classification scheme.412
The court found that EPA had erred procedurally, however, when, instead
of assembling a separate advisory committee under the Radon Act, it had
allowed a special committee of its existing Scientific Advisory Board (“SAB”)
to perform the advisory role the Act envisioned.413  The court found two prob-
lems with EPA’s procedural shortcut.  First, the Radon Act required EPA to
establish a representative advisory committee.  The use of the word “establish”
suggested that Congress meant for EPA to create a new committee, not borrow
an existing standing committee.  The second problem was that the Radon Act
also provided a role for the existing SAB in reviewing EPA’s broad indoor-air
research plan.  Had Congress intended for a committee of the SAB to double as
the statutory advisory committee, it presumably would have said so in the
Radon Act.414  Although perhaps insufficiently deferential to the agency’s inter-
pretation of its own statute, the court’s statutory analysis was by no means
unreasonable.
However, the court did not simply remand to the agency with instructions to
appoint a new advisory committee.  The tobacco industry persuaded the court
to rule on whether EPA’s modest procedural impropriety affected the assess-
ment itself.  To answer this question and to address the plaintiffs’ substantive
claims, the court engaged in a lengthy, detailed, and unnecessary inquiry into
the scientific merits of the FRA that is an indicator of things to come should the
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is con-
fronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
467 U.S. at 842-43.
412. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43.
413. This was an especially odd contention for the industry to make because at the time EPA was
preparing the DRA, the industry was strongly insisting that EPA have the document and the associated
workplace policy statement reviewed by the SAB.  Letter from Clausen Ely to Robert Axelrad 2 (Apr.
23, 1990) (Bates No. 2023989033).  At that time, the industry and its lawyers did not mention their con-
cern that the SAB was not composed of representatives of the various interest groups.  In fact, it
strongly opposed one appointment to the committee, Dr. David M. Burns, on the ground that his views
were representative of those of the anti-smoking groups.  Letter from Samuel D. Chilcote to William K.
Reilly (Aug. 10, 1990) (Bates No. 2023388016).
414. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (“Had Congress meant SAB when requiring a representative advisory
group, Congress would have specified SAB as it did in the subsequent paragraph.”).
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courts adopt a regulatory-Daubert approach to judicial review of agency risk
assessment.
1. Biological Plausibility
The court first examined the agency’s biological plausibility finding: that
ETS is likely to cause lung cancer because mainstream smoke is a well-known
lung carcinogen.  The industry had argued that ETS and mainstream smoke are
not sufficiently similar in chemical composition to permit EPA to draw conclu-
sions about the health effects of ETS from data concerning mainstream
smoke.415  This argument appeared to be supported in one FRA conclusion that
“ETS is rapidly diluted into the environment, and consequently, passive smok-
ers are exposed to much lower concentrations of these agents than are active
smokers.”416  But this observation rested on EPA’s rejecting the argument that it
could quantitatively assess health risks posed by ETS by expressing the non-
smoker dose as a cigarette-equivalent dose.  As the court noted, EPA had
rejected cigarette equivalence because the absolute and proportional quantities
of the components and physical states of ETS and mainstream smoke differ
substantially, because the agency was uncertain which tobacco-smoke constitu-
ents actually cause cancer, and because it did not know whether there were sig-
nificant differences in the way humans metabolize ETS versus mainstream
smoke.417
The court noted the industry argument that the same uncertainties becloud-
ing cigarette equivalence also undermined EPA’s reliance on data regarding the
health effects of mainstream smoke.  Additionally, the industry claimed that
EPA paid insufficient attention to several industry-commissioned analyses of
the biological plausibility issue418 and that it had failed to identify its criteria for
determining chemical similarity.419  Finally, the court observed the industry’s
challenge to EPA’s assumption that there was no threshold concentration
below which exposure to mainstream smoke would not cause human carcino-
genic effects.420
415. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52.  The court believed this to be a matter of some importance to the over-
all ETS risk assessment:
The importance of Plaintiffs’ arguments is that the biological plausibility analysis establishes
Chapter 5’s “a priori hypothesis” that ETS is a Group A carcinogen.  EPA uses this hypothe-
sis to justify the use of one-tailed significance tests, which the Agency in turn relies upon to
switch from a 95% to 90% confidence interval.
Id.
416. FINAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 397, at 2-8.
417. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
418. Id. at 453 nn.24-25.  In this regard the court referred to several hundred pages of analysis con-
tained in the following submissions: Comments of Cronan (JA 6,188); Comments of Gori (JA 10,839);
Comments of Todhunter (JA 10,072); Comments of Flamm (JA 10,633-34); Comments of Newell (JA
10,660-61); Comments of Reasor (JA 10,786); Comments of the Tobacco Institute (JA 9,537-38, 9,543);
Comments of Reasor (JA 10,789-90); Comments of R.J. Reynolds (JA 5,841-58); and Comments of
Philip Morris (JA 10,012, 10,024).
419. Id. at 453.  In this regard, the industry noted that EPA had previously declined to use chemical
similarity to classify chemical substances as human carcinogens.  Id.
420. Id.
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The court then restated EPA’s response that is had never suggested ETS
and mainstream smoke were chemically identical.  It had, in fact, repeatedly
noted the dissimilarities and pointed out that the chemical constituents of ETS
are diluted by the surrounding air.  The FRA’s drafters had nevertheless also
carefully analyzed exposure and biomarker studies of the extent humans inhale
and metabolize the chemical constituents of ETS.421  The industry’s argument,
the court observed, ignored the distinction EPA had consistently drawn
between qualitative hazard assessment conclusions and quantitative exposure
assessment: statements made in one context were not necessarily inconsistent
with those made in the other.422  EPA had repeatedly stressed that risk assess-
ment is an art that cannot be bound by hard-and-fast rules.423
Following its carefully balanced recapitulation of these arguments, the court
proceeded to analyze them in a most confused manner.  EPA had made clear
that the apparent discrepancies the industry seized upon stemmed from EPA
making qualitative comparisons of the chemical constituents of mainstream
smoke and ETS for the purpose of qualitative hazard assessment, while refuting
the industry’s attempt to use mainstream smoke and ETS exposure compari-
sons for the purpose of quantitative exposure assessment.
The FRA included a thorough and convincing rationale for rejecting the
industry’s suggested cigarette-equivalence approach.  The agency noted that
“[t]he differences in size distribution for [mainstream smoke] and [sidestream
smoke] particles, as well as the different breathing patterns of smokers and non-
smokers, have implications for deposition of the produced particle contami-
nants in various regions of the respiratory tract.”424  Yet “[d]espite quantitative
differences and potential differences in phase distributions, the air contami-
nants emitted in [mainstream smoke] and [sidestream smoke] are qualitatively
very similar in their chemical composition because they are produced by the
same process.”425  Indeed, “the available data indicate that tobacco combustion
results in the emission of a large number of known toxic compounds and that
many of these will be released at rates that are higher in [sidestream smoke]
than in [mainstream smoke].”426
With respect to exposure assessment, the agency had observed that envi-
ronmental concentrations of ETS constituents in indoor air resulted from a
“complex interaction” of nine variables, variations in any one of which could
have “a marked impact” on the ETS constituent concentrations.427  With so
421. Id. at 455.
422. Id. at 454.
423. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
424. FINAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 397, at 3-3.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 3-7.
427. Id. at 3-12.  The nine factors included:
1) the generation rate of the contaminant(s) from the tobacco (including both [sidestream
smoke] and exhaled [mainstream smoke] emissions), 2) location in the space that smoking
occurs, 3) the rate of tobacco consumption, 4) the ventilation or infiltration rate, 5) the con-
centration of the contaminant(s) in the ventilation or infiltration air, 6) air mixing in the space,
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many factors at play in assessing ETS exposures, it is not surprising that EPA
was uncomfortable with crude attempts to quantify ETS risks through cigarette-
equivalence estimates.  However, EPA did cite numerous studies demonstrating
that “1) many of the contaminants of health interest found in [sidestream
smoke] are also found in ETS; 2) ETS contaminants are found above back-
ground level in a wide range of indoor environments in which smoking occurs;
and 3) the concentrations of ETS contaminants indoors can be highly vari-
able.”428
The court recognized EPA’s point that, in addressing the four components
of quantitative risk assessment—hazard identification, dose-response assess-
ment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization—it is sometimes useful to
examine qualitative aspects of the data as well as quantitative aspects.429  In par-
ticular, it was not inconsistent to stress the chemical similarities in concluding
that ETS was probably carcinogenic in its hazard assessment while at the same
time refusing to rely upon those similarities by taking a cigarette-equivalence
approach to quantifying nonsmoker exposures in the quantitative exposure
assessment.  Thus, it was simply erroneous for the court to conclude that “EPA
apparently used a different risk assessment methodology for each chapter.”430
EPA’s treatment of mainstream smoke and ETS was not at all inconsistent
from a scientific perspective given the important distinction between qualitative
hazard assessment and quantitative exposure assessment and the recognition
that risk assessment is a multi-step process.
Having apparently misunderstood what EPA was attempting to accomplish
in the report, the court continued ad hominem, suggesting “the ugly possibility
that EPA [had varied its] methodology . . . , without explanation, based on the
outcome sought in that chapter.”431  The court found it “striking that [main-
stream smoke] and ETS were similar only where such a conclusion promoted
finding ETS a carcinogen.”432  However, this assessment of the science was not
at all striking and was entirely within the range of scientific plausibility.  From
the standpoint of precautionary risk assessment, EPA’s approach was not only
warranted but desirable.
The court was also troubled by EPA’s apparent failure to identify in
advance the criteria that would guide its determination whether ETS was
chemically similar to mainstream smoke.433  Noting that EPA conceded that
large uncertainties beclouded its attempts to draw conclusions about the car-
7) removal of contaminants by surfaces or chemical reactions, 8) re-emission of contaminants
by surfaces, and 9) the effectiveness of any air cleaners that may be present.
Id.
428. FINAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 397, at 3-13.
429. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 454-55.
430. Id. at 456.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 457.
433. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 457. (“The record presents no evidence of EPA establishing similarity criteria
before the Assessment.”).
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cinogenicity of ETS from the known carcinogenicity of mainstream smoke,434 the
court wondered how “EPA could still classify ETS a known human carcinogen
based on similarities between [sidestream] and [mainstream smoke].”435  Appar-
ently, the burden was on EPA to undertake the intensive scientific analysis of
chemical similarities required to draw firm conclusions before writing a report
that used such similarities as a basis for drawing conclusions about the hazards
of ETS.  The court thus rewarded the tobacco industry’s strategy of casting
doubt, but never undertaking the scientific studies necessary to resolve the
underlying question.
The court further faulted EPA for relying upon the epidemiology studies to
buttress its bioplausibility conclusion.  The court believed that it was “circular
for EPA to . . . argue the epidemiology studies support the agency’s a priori
[bioplausibility] theory” because “[w]ithout the theory, the [epidemiological]
studies would likely have done no such thing.”436  A risk assessment is, of course,
more convincing if the risk assessor can point to a theoretical biological expla-
nation for the statistical association the epidemiological studies reveal.  The
current state of biological science does not, however, provide theoretical con-
firmation for empirical observations, especially for exposures to complex mix-
tures like ETS.  At best, EPA could conclude from chemical similarity and
other considerations that a cause-effect relationship was sensible as a matter of
biology.  EPA was not arguing in circles; it was making the subtler point, consis-
tent with the weight-of-the-evidence approach, that the epidemiological studies
and the chemical similarity studies were mutually reinforcing.
Finally, the court alluded to dissenting voices within EPA to bolster its con-
clusion that the FRA lacked a sound scientific basis.  Scientific disagreement is
probably less commonplace in an agency than in the scientific community in
general, but differences in judgment about whether the scientific data support a
particular classification are not at all unusual.  If unanimity were required every
time a conclusion must to be reached on the basis of sketchy data and in the
face of large uncertainties, conclusions would never be possible.  The fact that
some EPA scientists believed ETS belonged in the Group B-1 category did not
especially undermine the agency’s conclusion that ETS belonged in the next
higher category.  The upper-level decisionmakrs within EPA apparently
believed the agency scientists supporting the Group A classification had the
better internal argument.  Although Judge Osteen, the judge who presided over
the Flue-Cured Tobacco case, might have resolved the internal agency dispute
differently, Judge Osteen was not the administrator of EPA.
434. Id. at 457 n.31.
435. Id. at 457.  The court also noted that “[t]he record also fails to explain whether or how EPA
determined that, because some components of ETS may be absorbed, questions raised in other areas of
the assessment about the carcinogenic potential of ETS were no longer relevant.”  Id.
436. Id. at 456.
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2. EPA’s Meta-analysis of the Epidemiological Data
The court paid careful attention to the scientific validity of EPA’s meta-
analysis.  Since the meta-analysis was fundamental to the risk assessment, any
rejection of that analysis was sufficient to invalidate EPA’s Group A carcinogen
conclusion and it therefore would have ratified the tobacco industry’s claim that
ETS had not been shown to cause cancer.  The court first evaluated industry
claims that EPA cherry-picked favorable studies for inclusion in the meta-
analysis.  It then evaluated the scientific validity of EPA’s choice of confidence
intervals and several other aspects of the agency’s statistical analysis.
a. Choice of studies.  At the time EPA released its FRA, the scientific lit-
erature contained thirty-three studies of nonsmoking female spouses (two of
which had not yet been completed and one of which was available only in pre-
liminary form), twelve studies of nonsmoking females in workplaces where
smoking was allowed, and thirteen studies of females exposed to ETS during
childhood.  EPA pooled the data reported in thirty completed and one partially
completed spousal studies into a single meta-analysis.  The industry argued that
EPA did not adequately explain why it included the thirty-one spouse studies in
its meta-analysis, while excluding the two incomplete studies and all of the
childhood and workplace studies.437  The court agreed with the industry.438
EPA had concluded that the data from the excluded studies were generally
less reliable because they contained less exposure information.  Without citing
or quoting from the record, the court found that “EPA’s three citations to the
record do not support this assertion.”439  If the purpose of a meta-analysis is to
combine data from studies involving similarly exposed individuals, however, it
would be sensible to exclude from any data from studies containing less expo-
sure information.  But to a technically unsophisticated judge unfamiliar with the
context, EPA’s terse explanation appeared conclusory and wanting.  Appar-
ently, EPA had the high burden of explaining every step it took in assembling
and analyzing supporting data in sufficient detail to persuade a skeptical
judge.440
437. Id. at 459.
438. Id. at 459-60.
439. Id. at 459.
440. EPA concluded that the workplace studies should be excluded from the meta-analysis because
only two of those studies made any attempt to classify subjects by ETS exposure.  Id.  As the court read
EPA’s risk assessment, this explanation appeared to be “targeted only at workplace data contained
within the spousal smoking studies and does not address the Agency’s decision to disregard workplace
and childhood exposure data reported outside spousal studies.”  Id. at 460.  Since the court did not
quote the language in the risk assessment that it relied upon in drawing this conclusion, it is difficult to
evaluate whether the court’s conclusion is correct.  The court made no further attempt to explain its
conclusion that EPA’s otherwise reasonable explanation was limited to workplace data in the spousal
studies.  Apparently, the court did not hold itself to the same obligation as the agency to explain its
conclusions.
Another reason cited by EPA for excluding the workplace and childhood studies from the meta-
analysis was the presence of confounding factors in those studies that rendered them less reliable.  The
court found that this rationale also lacked record support.  Id. at 459.  Indeed, the court found that the
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The court faulted in particular EPA’s decision to exclude the two most
recent spousal studies from the meta-analysis.  At the time it prepared the
report, EPA stated it did not consider the two studies in its meta-analysis
because they were submitted after the comment period closed, and the agency
had to draw the line somewhere; otherwise it would never be able to complete
the required report.  The agency gave three reasons for its apparently inconsis-
tent inclusion of data from one of the three unpublished studies: 1) interim
results of that study had been published, 2) it was the largest study of its kind,
and 3) its methodology was superior to that of any of the other studies.
To the court, however, the record did not support the agency’s seemingly
plausible distinction between the included study and the two excluded, incom-
plete studies.441  The court did not accept EPA’s conclusion that the included
study employed a superior methodology because the administrative record did
not include a full discussion of the criteria by which EPA determined such supe-
riority.  The court also noted that “[e]ven if EPA provided criteria, comparison
would not be possible since EPA provides no discussion on the two U.S. spousal
studies excluded.”442  The court might have concluded that the agency should
have waited for all three studies to be published, but EPA did not know at the
time whether they would be completed within a reasonable period.
b. The agency’s use of statistics.  Although demurring that it was “neither
necessary or desirable to delve further into EPA’s epidemiological web,” the
court nevertheless addressed two additional industry criticisms of the EPA
epidemiologists’ statistical meta-analysis techniques.443  First, the court restated
the industry’s allegation that EPA used a 90% confidence interval in its meta-
Advisory Committee Report cited by EPA supported the opposite conclusion.  Id.  Once again the
court offered only a single conclusory statement to support its assessment of EPA’s reasoning process.
Id.
Finally, in rejecting the childhood studies, EPA cited the fact that the studies were heavily depend-
ent upon childhood memories to estimate childhood exposures.  Id. at 460.  Although EPA explicitly
stated its conclusion that “recall of ETS exposure in childhood is more difficult than recall of such
exposure in adulthood,” and cited a published study in support of this conclusion, the court did not
view this as sufficiently supporting EPA’s decision to exclude the childhood data from its meta-analysis.
Id.  Again the court offered no explanation for its conclusion.
441. The court further found that the decision to exclude the two recent studies conflicted with the
Radon Act’s requirement that  “EPA’s [indoor air risk assessment] program shall ‘gather data and
information on all aspects of indoor air quality.’” 4 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (quoting Radon Act § 403(a)(1)).
The quoted language from the statute requires the agency to consider all aspects of indoor air quality.
Aspects of indoor air quality would presumably include the chemical composition of various indoor air
environments, ventilation and air flow considerations, exposure patterns, and the toxicity of various
indoor air pollutants.  The statute plainly did not require the agency to consider all available data on all
aspects of indoor air pollution, whether or not the relevant studies were completed and had survived
peer review and were published in a scientific journal.  The statute did not preclude EPA from consid-
ering unpublished data, but it certainly did not require it either.  The court’s one-sentence explanation
was as follows: “In conducting a risk assessment under the Act, EPA deliberately refused to assess
information on all aspects of indoor air quality.”  Id.  The court neither explained how it interpreted the
statute, nor how the statutory language applied to EPA’s report.  In particular, the court failed to point
to a single aspect of indoor air quality that EPA deliberately refused to assess.
442. Id. at 460.  The court did not address the other two reasons for including the Fontham study.
443. Id. at 460-61.
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analysis, rather than the 95% interval deemed appropriate by the industry and
used in the DRA, “to enhance the likelihood that its meta-analysis would
appear statistically significant.”444  The court then noted EPA’s explanation that
using the 90% interval avoided what would have been an apparent statistical
discrepancy.445
Second, the court noted the industry’s complaint that EPA classified ETS as
a Group A carcinogen, in large part based on a relative risk of only 1.19, with-
out adequately explaining why the agency required every other Group A car-
cinogen to exhibit a much higher relative risk, or why EPA recently found rela-
tive risks of 2.6 and 3.0 insufficient to classify other such agents as Group A
carcinogens.  In the industry’s view, EPA had singled out ETS for Group A
ranking.  To this contention, EPA had responded that the data on ETS differed
from the data on some other chemicals in both the number of studies showing a
positive correlation between exposure and cancer and the strength of the cor-
relation that had been shown.446
The court concluded that the studies relied upon by EPA would not yield a
statistically significant correlation between ETS and cancer if standard statisti-
cal methodologies were employed.447 The court did not identify those method-
ologies it deemed “standard,” nor did it explain why it was inappropriate to
employ a 90% confidence interval.  Indeed, it is not at all clear from the opinion
that the court understood the purpose of confidence intervals and levels of sta-
tistical significance in epidemiological analysis.  Once again, the court put the
burden on the agency to educate and explain why it employed the methodolo-
gies that it did.
The court was also troubled that answers to many of the industry’s concerns
came from the agency’s lawyers rather than the FRA itself.  The court per-
ceived that the agency was changing its explanation mid-stream and therefore
had a heightened duty to explain itself.448  But the court gave no reasons for
444. Id. at 461.  One member of the SAB committee had raised the same complaint.  Id. (quoting
Geoffrey Kabat, Comments on EPA’s Draft Report: “Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking:
Lung Cancer and Other Disorders” (July 28, 1992)).  The industry also noted that previous ETS studies
by the National Academy of Sciences, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, and the Sur-
geon General employed a 95% confidence interval.  Id.
445. Id. at 461.  EPA’s concern was that “use of the 95 percent confidence interval with the one-
tailed test . . . would have produced an apparent discrepancy:  study results that were statistically signifi-
cant using the standard p-value of .05 might nevertheless have a 95 percent confidence interval that
included a relative risk of 1.”  Id. (quoting Conformed Memorandum Supporting EPA’s Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment at 96, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435.).
446. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
447. Id.  This was because “[a]nalysis conducted with a .05 significance level and 95% confidence
level included relative risks of 1.”
448. The court cited several cases to support its conclusion that the agency record must support its
action and that agencies have a heightened duty to explain changes in methodologies.  Id. (citing Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 768 F.2d 385, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); W. States Petroleum Ass’n v.
EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1996); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 205-11
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).  All of these cases involved informal rulemaking proceedings in which the outcome
was a binding rule enforceable with fines and even criminal sanctions.  In each case, the agency’s attor-
neys were heavily involved in drafting the text of the rule, in analyzing the comments on the proposed
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believing that EPA’s position had changed between the time the FRA was pub-
lished and the filing of briefs.  Not surprisingly, the agency felt obliged to brief
the arguments raised by the industry in its voluminous filings.  That the agency
risk assessors had not anticipated the industry lawyers’ subsequent contentions
did not suggest a shift in agency position; they were writing for a largely techni-
cal audience.  The fact that the agency brief addressed specific contentions
more thoroughly than the risk assessment itself is easily explained by the highly
unusual posture in which the agency found itself when the court denied its
motion to dismiss.  The court’s decision allowing the industry leave to file a
lengthy brief filled with flyspeck criticism of a scientific report drafted without
the aid of agency attorneys forced the agency to respond in kind.
E. Assessment of the Flue-Cured Tobacco Opinion
Although the court “vacated” chapters 1 through 6 and the relevant appen-
dices of the FRA, the consequences of a court’s vacating an agency risk assess-
ment are far from clear.  The report could not be erased or retroactively deleted
from the agency’s computers, and the degree of its persuasiveness should not be
affected by one judge’s assessment of the validity of its scientific conclusions.
Should another agency rely upon the report in regulating ETS exposure, it is
not at all clear that such reliance would jeopardize the validity of that agency’s
conclusions.  Another reviewing court would not have to defer to the Flue-
Cured Tobacco court’s conclusions regarding the validity of the scientific analy-
ses in the report.  Presumably, it would review that agency’s action on the basis
of the rulemaking record, in light of that agency’s explanations.
Nevertheless, the court’s rejection of EPA’s meta-analysis is a fine example
of the corpuscular approach in action.  The court placed the burden on EPA to
justify every contested detail of the analysis through reference to contempora-
neous statements made on an official record compiled during the risk assess-
ment process.  The agency had to explain why it included some studies in the
meta-analysis and excluded others, and its explanations had to be plausible to
the untrained and technically unsophisticated judge.  A brief explanation that
would have satisfied scientists familiar with the context appeared conclusory to
a judge whose education on the relevant issues was presumably limited
primarily to the briefs prepared by the parties’ lawyers.
The court resolved the issues of scientific validity on the informal, nonlegal
record before it, with very little deference to the agency’s expertise, and with
very little appreciation for the subtleties of the science.  In doing so, the court
rule, and in crafting the preambles in which the agency provided its explanation for its rule and cited
the evidence from the rulemaking record.  The agency action before the court in Flue-Cured Tobacco
was not a formal rule, but rather a scientific report that could perhaps be cited in future rulemaking
endeavors.  It was intended to survive the sort of scientific criticism from the scientific community that
such reports typically undergo, rather than the sort of legal analysis typically required of agency rules.
Unlike the industry, which viewed the proceedings as a legal battle and enlisted the support of dozens
of lawyers from the outset, EPA regarded the matter as a scientific one, to be resolved by an advisory
committee of scientists, with minimal input from agency attorneys.
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limited its attention to briefed arguments and did not take the time to view or
perhaps even read the entire risk assessment.  The court clearly put the burden
on EPA to rebut each industry assertion by citing evidence in the record of suf-
ficient credibility to convince the court that the industry’s arguments were mis-
placed.  This legalistic approach prevented the agency from relying on a holistic
assessment under a weight-of-the-available-evidence standard illuminated by
the current state of scientific knowledge.  While lawyers are trained to docu-
ment assertions with citations to precedent and available evidence, without
regard to whether the assertions meet an overall test of scientific plausibility,
scientists do not think or act in this way.  Reports prepared by the National
Research Council do not provide citation to a “scientific record” for every criti-
cal fact found and inference drawn.  Yet, those reports are often enormously
influential in public policymaking.
The court’s demand for scientific-record support for various contentions in
the agency’s brief apparently reflects its misunderstanding of the risk assess-
ment preparation process as a relatively formal administrative proceeding with
an identifiable record.  Although not required by the Radon Act or the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, EPA employed notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cedures for the purpose of maximizing public input into the drafting and
redrafting process.  There was a record of sorts, but it certainly was not
prepared with judicial review in mind.  The agency prepared a transcript of the
SAB proceedings, sworn testimony, and cross-examination, but the SAB proce-
dures did not require mandatory document production.  By requiring the
agency to cite record support for arguments raised in response to the industry’s
briefs, the court effectively turned the process ex post facto into a formal
administrative proceeding.  It is not surprising that EPA failed to satisfy a judge
demanding a great deal of record explanation from a record never intended to
be scrutinized under judicial review.
The industry’s strategy from the outset was to employ legal arguments and
analysis to characterize the risk assessment as a legal document and therefore
subject to legal challenge.  With virtually unlimited resources, the industry’s sci-
entific consultants and lawyers spent hundreds of hours poring over the report
and the relied-upon studies to find gaps in the agency’s explanations.  The
industry then demanded that the agency rebut its specific challenges, and the
court placed that burden upon the agency.  The legal strategy was successful in
the district court, and if EPA had been authorized to take any action against
indoor smoking, it would have been prevented from doing so.  Yet the agency
had never asserted authority to do anything other than prepare and make avail-
able a report on the risks posed by ETS.
One unresolved mystery of Flue-Cured Tobacco is why the court devoted
the vast bulk of its written opinion to a Daubert-like analysis of the industry’s
challenge to the factual basis of EPA’s report.  The court’s resolution of EPA’s
failure to appoint a properly representative advisory committee was outcome
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determinative.  If the court’s legal analysis was correct, it was not necessary to
devote such considerable attention to the merits of the case.
One explanation is that the court feared EPA would simply march its sol-
diers down the hill and march them back again without encountering a solid cri-
tique of the report’s substance.  Essentially, EPA would prepare a new report
with the same deficiencies—this time by a properly constituted advisory com-
mittee—reaching the same conclusion: that ETS is a Group A carcinogen.  The
court might have felt its own deep foray into the merits in search of record sup-
port was necessary to ensure that EPA paid sufficient attention to industry rep-
resentatives on the new advisory committee.
Alternatively, the court might have been determined to ensure that the ulti-
mate outcome of the process reflected sound science.  The industry briefs were
highly critical of many aspects of EPA’s analysis, and many of the industry cri-
tiques appeared plausible to the court.  The court might have seized upon those
critiques as an opportunity to teach the agency a lesson in how an administra-
tive record should support a scientific conclusion.  Scientists draw conclusions
based upon the exercise of scientific judgment, without lengthy side-explana-
tions about why they exercised their judgment the way they did.  The court,
accustomed to abundant legal documentation and explanation, might have
found it necessary to give EPA a lesson in how to craft a scientific conclusion
with legal-type support.  Had the court’s holding not been overturned on ripe-
ness grounds, EPA’s legal counsel would no doubt have played a much larger
role in writing the next ETS report.
Finally, the court might have wanted to limit the practical impact the risk
assessment would have on other decision-making entities such as OSHA, local
governments, and private employers.  A simple remand to run the report
through a properly constituted advisory committee would not undermine the
substance of the risk assessment in the minds of future decisionmakers, and it
would certainly not persuade entities that had already imposed smoking bans to
lift them.  A judicial opinion attacking the substance and scientific validity of
the report, on the other hand, could seriously undermine efforts to ban smoking
in public areas.  Industry documents never intended for public review reveal
beyond cavil that the industry’s strategy from the outset was to bolster its politi-
cal efforts, blunting the force of anti-smoking efforts across the United States
through judicial challenge.  The court delivered an opinion in line with the
industry’s political needs.  Whether this alignment was by design or merely the
unintended consequence of an exceedingly successful strategy is a question only
the judge can answer.
IV
THE DANGERS OF DAUBERTIZING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT
In the past, courts have resisted efforts by the regulated community to Dau-
bertize judicial review of risk assessment.  For example, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the industry’s invitation to adopt a Daubert-like standard of in review-
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ing OSHA’s standard for worker exposure to ethylene oxide (EtO) under the
substantial evidence test.  The court observed of the industry’s arguments:
[The industry] attacks each piece of evidence, suggesting that no individual piece
proves a relationship between EtO exposure and various adverse health effects.  This
approach disregards the marginal contribution that each piece of evidence makes to
the total picture.  While some of OSHA’s evidence suffers from shortcomings, such
incomplete proof is inevitable when the Agency regulates on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge. . . .  OSHA need not “prove” its assertions in the manner AEOU
demands . . . .  Rather, OSHA need only gather evidence from which it can reasonably
draw the conclusion it has reached.  Our function . . . is only to search for substantial
evidence, not proof positive.449
Similarly, in reviewing EPA’s decision to phase tetraethyl lead out of gasoline,
the D.C. Circuit stated:
Contrary to the apparent suggestion of some of the petitioners, we need not seek a
single dispositive study that fully supports the Administrator’s determination.  Science
does not work that way; nor, for that matter, does adjudicatory factfinding.  Rather,
the Administrator’s decision may be fully supportable if it is based, as it is, on the
inconclusive but suggestive results of numerous studies.  By its nature, scientific evi-
dence is cumulative: the more supporting, albeit inconclusive, evidence available, the
more likely the accuracy of the conclusion. . . .  Thus, after considering the inferences
that can be drawn from the studies supporting the Administrator, and those opposing
him, we must decide whether the cumulative effect of all this evidence, and not the
effect of any single bit of it, presents a rational basis for the . . . regulations.450
More recently, in upholding EPA’s revisions to the ozone and fine particulate
national ambient air quality standards, the court reaffirmed that:
It is not our function to resolve disagreement among the experts or to judge the merits
of competing expert views.  Our task is the limited one of ascertaining that the choices
made by the [EPA] Administrator were reasonable and supported by the record. That
the evidence in the record may also support other conclusions, even those that are
inconsistent with the Administrator’s, does not prevent us from concluding that [her]
decisions were rational and supported by the record.451
Thus far, the courts have sensibly refrained from acting as gatekeeper with
respect to the scientific information agencies must rely upon in preparing risk
assessments.  This judicial reticence is sensible for several reasons.
First, the courts have played a prominent role in the ossification of informal
rulemaking and the consequent inability of regulatory agencies to implement
their statutory missions.  One partial solution to the ossification problem is for
the courts to back off.452  To reduce judicial scrutiny, a “pass/fail professor” test
should replace the hard-look doctrine.453  Daubertizing judicial review of risk
assessment would be a move in precisely the opposite direction.
449. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
450. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
451. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Lead Indus. Ass’n,
Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
452. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1453 (1992) (recommending that the courts replace the “hard look” doctrine with “a more defer-
ential image”).
453. Id.  The “pass/fail professor” test is described as follows:
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Second, judges do not always have a good sense for what is relevant in com-
plex risk assessments.  The essence of the blunderbuss attack strategy against an
agency risk assessment is the search for any inconsistency or instance in which
the agency did not analyze a particular matter in sufficient depth.  The petition-
ers’ arguments, which are the primary indicators of the importance of particular
issues, tend to elevate trivial issues to the level of importance required to con-
vince the court that the error, failure, or omission warrants remand.  Not sur-
prisingly, many reviewing judges demonstrate a “remarkable instinct for the
capillary” in reviewing agency rules.454  Unaware of which issue might ultimately
doom a rulemaking initiative, agencies will be compelled to over-analyze every
issue, no matter how trivial, wasting scarce analytical resources responding to
minutiae.  Under regulatory Daubert, the blunderbuss attack stands a good
chance of producing the desired result—a malfunctioning regulatory process .455
Third, judges who come to the task with an anti-government ideological per-
spective are not always as concerned with the quality of agency decisions as
they are with ensuring that agencies do not encroach too deeply upon private
markets.456  Assigning a gatekeeper role to the courts under a regulatory-Dau-
bert regime would provide an opportunity for judges intent on reducing the fed-
eral government’s role in commercial activities to force those agencies to
become more timid in carrying out their statutory missions.  Although it is
unclear whether Daubertizing judicial review will enhance the quality of agency
decision-making, it almost certainly will result in regulations that are less
A better metaphor may be that of the “pass-fail prof” who must determine whether a research
paper on a topic with which he is vaguely familiar meets the minimum standards for passable
work.  His disagreement with the paper’s conclusions will certainly not cause him to flunk the
student.  Even a poor analysis will not cause the paper to fail, if it is at least plausible.  A
check of the citations may reveal that the student could have found more sources or that he
may have mischaracterized one of the cited sources, and still the paper will pass.  Only where
there is an inexcusable gap in the analysis, an obvious misquote, or evidence of intellectual
dishonesty, will the pass-fail prof give the student an “F” and order the student to try again.
Id.
454. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Unruly Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 5 NAT. RES. & ENV., Fall 1990, at
23, 24.
455. For example, common-law courts applying Daubert principles in common-law torts cases rou-
tinely exclude testimony based upon meta-analysis of epidemiological data as scientifically unreliable,
despite the fact that epidemiologists routinely employ meta-analysis to enhance their understanding of
epidemiological data.  See Beecher-Monas, supra note 37, at 1072 (concluding that “the courts’ whole-
sale rejection of meta-analysis has little scientific justification”).
456. See Gulf S. Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983); see
also DEVRA LEE DAVIS, THE “SHOTGUN WEDDING” OF SCIENCE AND LAW: RISK ASSESSMENT AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 67, 85 (1985) (“The decision stands simply as a remarkable judicial probe of an
agency’s record on a narrow question.”); Nicholas A. Ashford et al., A Hard Look at Federal Regula-
tion of Formaldehyde: A Departure From Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 368
(1983) (“[W]e find the Fifth Circuit’s analysis to be unpersuasive in its evaluation of CPSC’s cancer risk
assessment for formaldehyde.”); Howard A. Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk
Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 131 (1989) (“The court’s opinion reflects . . . a fundamental misun-
derstanding of the limited evidence on which most risk assessments of carcinogens are based.”); Rich-
ard A. Merrill, The Legal System’s Response to Scientific Uncertainty: The Role of Judicial Review, 4
FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED TOXICOLOGY S418, S425 (1984) (“The opinion’s close scrutiny of an exer-
cise that is fraught with uncertainty, but yet promises improvement in regulation of health hazards, is
disconcerting.”).
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burdensome to regulatees.  This is precisely the outcome that most regulatees,
and many judges, desire.
Fourth, Daubertizing judicial review of agency risk assessment will pervert
the process of health and environmental risk assessment by encouraging lawyer-
dominated attempts to bend science to the will of regulated industry.  From the
moment the tobacco industry learned that an epidemiological study would be
published suggesting an association between exposure to ETS and lung cancer,
the industry and its lawyers launched a crusade to discredit that study and sub-
sequent studies.  Industry consultants were hired to flood the publishing journal
with letters critiquing the study.  Public relations consultants filled the media
with attacks on the studies and suggestions that the question of the ETS health
risk was still very much undecided.  Industry lawyers and sympathetic politi-
cians attempted to manipulate the composition of the agency’s advisory com-
mittee, and the industry deluged the agency in a flood of industry-funded com-
ments and criticisms of the agency’s early drafts.  All of this was undertaken
with the expectation that the agency would ultimately retreat and write a more
equivocal document, but it was also done with an eye toward the litigation that
would follow if the agency did not.
Finally, and most importantly, by encouraging such blunderbuss attacks,
regulatory-Daubert judicial review will ultimately distort the science underlying
agency risk assessment.  Conversely, a weight-of-the-evidence approach makes
good sense as a scientific matter.  No study is perfect, and scientists are forced
to make assessments about how the universe works on the basis of incomplete
scientific information.  Risk assessments are necessarily tentative and can fre-
quently be stated with greater confidence as additional studies help strengthen
the underlying scientific foundation.  If agency risk assessments are to be based
upon science, agency risk assessors must be permitted, perhaps with the help of
qualified experts, to look at the entirety of the scientific database.  Their analy-
ses should not be confined to those studies likely to be deemed scientifically
reliable by a judge, at the end of an adversarial proceeding.
V
CONCLUSION
The predictable consequence of Daubertizing judicial review of agency risk
assessment will be an overall reduction in the protections government provides
to those at risk.  At the very least, more stringent judicial review will result in
more remands.  If agencies react as regulatory-Daubert advocates hope they
will, risk assessments will contain better supported and more cautious conclu-
sions.  To the extent agencies in turn rely upon risk assessments to support
regulatory actions, more cautious risk assessments will yield less stringent
regulations.  Thus, while Daubertizing judicial review might or might not pro-
duce more scientifically sound agency risk assessments, it will almost certainly
yield fewer and less stringent regulations.  Like the regulatory reformers of the
104th Congress, the not-so-hidden agenda of regulatory-Daubert advocates is
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most likely regulatory relief.  The courts should resist the invitation to play such
an overtly political role in the way society addresses health and environmental
risk.
